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Abstract
We study a data analyst’s problem of acquiring data from self-interested individuals to
obtain an accurate estimation of some statistic of a population, subject to an expected budget
constraint. Each data holder incurs a cost, which is unknown to the data analyst, to acquire
and report his data. The cost can be arbitrarily correlated with the data. The data analyst
has an expected budget that she can use to incentivize individuals to provide their data. The
goal is to design a joint acquisition-estimation mechanism to optimize the performance of the
produced estimator, without any prior information on the underlying distribution of cost and
data. We investigate two types of estimations: unbiased point estimation and confidence interval
estimation.
Unbiased estimators: We design a truthful, individually rational, online mechanism to ac-
quire data from individuals and output an unbiased estimator of the population mean
when the data analyst has no prior information on the cost-data distribution and individ-
uals arrive in a random order. The performance of this mechanism matches that of the
optimal mechanism, which knows the true cost distribution, within a constant factor. The
performance of an estimator is evaluated by its variance under the worst-case cost-data
correlation.
Confidence intervals: We characterize an approximately optimal (within a factor 2) mech-
anism for obtaining a confidence interval of the population mean when the data analyst
knows the true cost distribution at the beginning. This mechanism is efficiently com-
putable. We then design a truthful, individually rational, online algorithm that is only
worse than the approximately optimal mechanism by a constant factor. The performance
of an estimator is evaluated by its expected length under the worst-case cost-data corre-
lation.
1 Introduction
We study a data analyst’s problem of estimating a population statistic (e.g. mean workout time
in November) when data need to be acquired from self-interested data holders and the analyst has
an expected budget constraint. Each data holder has a heterogeneous private cost to acquire and
report his data (e.g. record duration of each workout in a month and report the total) and needs
to be compensated at least by this cost to reveal his data. Individuals cannot fabricate their data
if they decide to reveal it. Moreover, the values of the data and the private costs can be arbitrarily
correlated in the population (e.g. those who work out regularly may use some fitness tracker which
automatically records workout durations) and the correlation is unknown to the analyst a priori.
A naive way for the analyst to acquire data in this setting is to offer a fixed compensation for each
individual’s data. But unless the payment level is higher than everyone’s cost, in which case the
analyst may run out of budget quickly and only be able to obtain a small sample, the collected
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sample will bias toward a low-cost subpopulation. Thus, the problem is how to design a joint
pricing-estimation mechanism to get accurate estimations when data holders are strategic.
The problem of purchasing data for unbiased estimation of population mean was first formu-
lated by Roth and Schoenebeck [2012] and then further studied by Chen et al. [2018a]. Both works
however assume that the cost distribution is known to the analyst and aim at obtaining an optimal
unbiased estimator with minimum worst-case variance for population mean, where the worst-case is
over all data-cost distributions consistent with the known cost distribution, subject to an expected
budget constraint. The mechanism proposed by Roth and Schoenebeck [2012] achieves optimality
approximately when the cost distribution has piece-wise differentiable PDF, while the mechanism
proposed by Chen et al. [2018a] achieves the exact optimality when the cost distribution is regular.
Chen et al. [2018a] also extend the result to linear regression. The high-level idea of both mecha-
nisms is to acquire a data point with reported cost ci with a positive probability A(ci) (and some
payment that is greater than or equal to ci), then remove the sampling bias by re-weighting each
collected data by 1/A(ci), and finally average the re-weighted data to obtain an unbiased estimation
(the Horvitz-Thompson Estimator). The assumption that the cost distribution is known allows the
analyst to turn the mechanism design problem into a constrained optimization problem for finding
an optimal allocation rule A(ci).
Our paper makes two novel contributions, both of which do away from the main limiting as-
sumptions of the prior works. First, we consider a data analyst with no prior information on the
data holders’ costs. We design an online mechanism that outputs an unbiased estimation of pop-
ulation mean, with the same goal as in the prior works: minimize the variance of the unbiased
estimator subject to a budget constraint. Our only assumption is that data holders show up in a
uniformly random order. Here the challenge is that, in order to price well, the analyst needs to
learn the cost distribution, but the pricing decisions need to be made for every arriving data holder.
Our second contribution is to consider the bias-variance trade-off of the estimator. The previous
works only consider unbiased estimators and the goal is to minimize the variance of the estimator.
In this work, we allow the estimator to be biased and try to minimize the length of the confidence
interval around the population mean, given a budget constraint. This necessarily requires us to
reason about bias-variance trade-off together with data pricing, an aspect that, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been explored in the literature. We design mechanisms for both the scenario
where the analyst knows the cost distribution and the scenario where there is no prior information
on costs.
1.1 Summary of Our Results and Techniques
Our work mainly addresses two questions:
1. If the data analyst does not have any prior information on data holders’ private costs (as
well as their private data), is it possible to design an online data acquisition mechanism for
unbiased estimation of population mean that is competitive with the optimal mechanism that
knows the cost distribution a priori?
2. Can we design an optimal joint acquisition-estimation mechanism for estimating confidence
intervals of population mean, when cost distribution is known? Optimality here means min-
imum length of the confidence interval. When cost distribution is unknown, can we design
an online joint acquisition-estimation mechanism for confidence intervals that is competitive
with the optimal mechanism that knows the cost distribution a priori?
For the first question, we design an online mechanism that is only worse than the optimal mechanism
by a constant factor. The only substantial assumption we make in our setting is that the data
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holders come in random order, so if there are n data holders in total, the cost-data distribution
at each round is the discrete uniform distribution over the set of cost-data pairs of these n data
holders. Our mechanism satisfies the budget constraint in expectation, with the guarantee that the
data holders will always be willing to participate and truthfully report their costs.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). For the problem of purchasing data to get an unbiased estimator of
population mean, assuming that the data holders come in random order, our online mechanism
satisfies the following properties: (1) it is truthful and individually rational, (2) it satisfies the
expected budget constraint, and (3) for any cost distribution, the variance of the produced unbiased
estimator approaches that of the benchmark within a constant factor, where the benchmark is the
optimal mechanism that knows the true cost distribution a priori.
For the second question, we extend our mechanism to output a confidence interval (using sam-
ple mean and sample variance). The mechanism may introduce some bias to mean estimation
in exchange for a lower variance, so that the length of the confidence interval is approximately
optimized. We provide the characterization of the approximately optimal confidence interval mech-
anism when the cost distribution is known. This characterization allows us to efficiently compute
the mechanism. We then design an online mechanism that matches the performance of the optimal
mechanism that knows the cost distribution within a constant factor.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). For the problem of purchasing data to obtain a confidence interval, the
approximately optimal mechanism that knows the cost distribution can be computed in polynomial
time.
This approximately optimal mechanism with known costs is constructed by analyzing the bias
and variance trade-off for estimators for the mean. At any given bias level, by producing an
estimator that has the lowest variance (for that bias level), we can construct a confidence interval
using this biased mean estimation. We hence can design a mechanism to optimize for the length
of the confidence interval. Since the optimal mechanism is difficult to compute, we approximate it
to gain computational efficiency.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). For the problem of purchasing data to obtain a confidence interval,
assuming that the data holders come in random order, our online mechanism has the following
properties: (1) it is truthful and individually rational, (2) it satisfies the expected budget constraint,
and (3) for any cost distribution, the performance of the produced confidence interval approaches
that of the benchmark within a constant factor, where the benchmark is the optimal mechanism that
knows the true cost distribution a priori.
Our online mechanisms for both unbiased mean estimation and confidence interval are designed
using approximately optimal mechanisms with known costs as building blocks. At any round i, the
reported costs in previous rounds gives us an empirical cost distribution. We then apply the optimal
mechanism for this cost distribution for data holder i. Each round’s mechanism has a fraction of
the total expected budget. Our online mechanisms allocate more budget for early rounds in a way
so that the performance of the final produced estimator is only worse than the benchmark by a
constant factor.
1.2 Other Related Work
There is a growing interest in understanding statistical estimation and learning in environments
with strategic agents. The works can be put in a few categories depending on the sources and types
of strategic considerations.
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In this work, as well as Roth and Schoenebeck [2012] and Chen et al. [2018a], agents do not de-
rive utility or disutility from the estimation outcome, cannot fabricate their data, and have a cost for
revealing their data. The mechanism uses payment to incentivize data revelation. Abernethy et al.
[2015] is similar on these fronts, but the work considers general supervised learning. They do not
seek to achieve a notion of optimality. Instead, they take a learning-theoretic approach and design
mechanisms to obtain learning guarantees (risk bounds). Cai et al. [2015] focused on incentivizing
individuals to exert effort to obtain high-quality data for the purpose of linear regression.
Another line of research examines data acquisition using differential privacy [Ghosh and Roth,
2011, Fleischer and Lyu, 2012, Ghosh et al., 2014, Nissim et al., 2014, Cummings et al., 2015].
Agents care about their privacy and hence may be reluctant to reveal their data. The mecha-
nism designer uses payments to balance the trade-off between privacy and accuracy. In this work,
we implicitly assume that data holders to not have a privacy cost and hence they don’t worry about
potential leaking of their data by reporting their cost. In Section 6, we discuss the complication
when data holders care about their privacy and their data and costs are correlated.
A third line of research studies settings where data holders may strategically misreport their
data, there is no ground truth to verify the acquired data, and the analyst would like to design
payment mechanisms to incentivize truthful data reporting for the purpose of regression or other
analyses [Liu and Chen, 2018, 2016, 2017]. Because of the lack of verification, this line of work is
closely related to the literature on peer prediction [Miller et al., 2005, Shnayder et al., 2016].
In a fourth line of research, individuals’ utilities directly depend on the inference or learning
outcome (e.g. they want a regression line to be as close to their own data point as possible) and
they can manipulate their reported data to influence the outcome. In these works, there often
is no cost for reporting one’s data and the data analyst doesn’t use monetary payments. These
works attempt to design or identify mechanisms (inference or learning processes) that are robust to
potential data manipulations [Dekel et al., 2010, Meir et al., 2011, 2012, Perote and Perote-Pen˜a,
2003, 2004, Hardt et al., 2016, Dong et al., 2017, Chen et al., 2018b].
1.3 Organization of the Paper
In the rest of the paper, we first formulate and characterize the optimal (or approximately optimal)
mechanisms for the unbiased mean estimation and the confidence interval estimation when the
cost distribution is known (Section 3 and Section 4 respectively). These mechanisms serve both as
building blocks for developing our online mechanisms when the cost distribution is unknown and as
benchmarks to which our online mechanisms are compared. Section 5 turns to the setting when the
cost distribution is unknown. We develop online mechanisms with proven performance guarantees
for both the unbiased mean estimation and the confidence interval estimation. We conclude with
discussions and future directions in Section 6.
2 Model
Consider a data analyst who conducts a survey to estimate some statistic of a population of n
people. In this work we focus on estimating the mean of some parameter of interest (e.g. alcohol
consumption or BMI of an individual), denoted by z, and the confidence interval of the mean. Each
individual incurs a cost ci, unknown to the data analyst, to acquire and report his data zi. The
cost and data pair can be correlated (e.g. those who consume more alcohol may have a higher cost
recording their consumption), and follows an unknown distribution D supported on (C,Z). We
assume that the cost is bounded by C, i.e., C ⊆ [0, C ]. The parameter z is also bounded, and,
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without loss of generality, we assume z is between 0 and 1, i.e., Z ⊆ [0, 1]. The data analyst has a
budget B = nB that she can use to purchase data from the data holders.
We study an online setting where data holders arrive one by one to the survey, and no prior
information on the distributionD (including the marginal distribution of the cost) is available before
the survey. The analyst can gradually learn the distribution as data holders report their data. We
make the following assumptions about the data sequence: (1) each individual only appears once,
and (2) the data holders arrive in a random order, i.e., each permutation of the n people is equally
likely. We use (c, z) = (c1, z1), . . . , (cn, zn) to denote a random sequence of costs and data points,
and {(c1, z1), . . . , (cn, zn)} to represent a set of people’s cost and data without the consideration of
order.
When data holder i arrives, the analyst asks the data holder to report his cost. We use ĉi to
denote the reported cost of data holder i. Based on the reported cost, the analyst may offer a
price to acquire the data zi. Formally, the analyst uses a survey mechanism, M = (A,P ), which
consists of an allocation rule A : C → [0, 1] and a payment rule P : C → R. With probability A(ĉi),
the analyst offers payment P (ĉi) to purchase data zi. If the data holder accepts this payment, he
gives his data zi to the analyst. We assume that data holders do not misreport their data zi. This
assumption holds in situations when data can be verified once collected (e.g. medical records). The
data holder walks away without revealing his data if P (ĉi) < ci. With probability 1 − A(ĉi), the
analyst does not attempt to acquire the data.1
The analyst can adaptively choose a survey mechanism for each arriving data holder. We use
M = (A,P) = (A1, P 1), . . . , (An, Pn) to represent a sequence of survey mechanisms. At round i,
the analyst chooses an allocation rule Ai and a payment rule P i based on all observed information
before round i, denoted by Hi−1. Hi−1 includes the reported costs of the previous i − 1 data
holders and data points that have been acquired. The survey mechanism (Ai, P i) applies to the
i-th arriving data holder. At the end of round n, the data analyst outputs an estimator S(M, (c, z))
based on all observed information Hn.
We want to design survey mechanisms that have the following incentive and budget properties:
Individual rationality: The utility of each data holder is always non-negative, i.e., P i(ĉi) ≥ ĉi
for all i and ĉi.
Truthfulness in expectation: A data holder maximizes his expected utility by reporting his cost
truthfully, i.e., Ai(ci)(P
i(ci)− ci) ≥ Ai(ĉi)(P i(ĉi)− ci) for all i and ĉi 6= ci.
Expected budget feasibility: E
[∑n
i=1A
i(ci) · P i(ci)
] ≤ B = n · B, where the expectation is
taken over the random arriving order of the data holders and the internal randomness of the
mechanism.
In this work we mainly investigate two types of estimation tasks: (1) get an unbiased estimator
of the population mean, with the goal that the variance of the estimator is minimized; (2) find
a confidence interval of the population mean, with the goal that the length of the confidence
interval is minimized. As an estimator uses data obtained via survey mechanisms M, it necessarily
depends on M. We now formally define unbiased estimator and confidence interval of population
mean in our setting. The randomness of an estimator S(M, (c, z)) comes in two parts: (1) the
external randomness, which is the random order of (c, z), and (2) the internal randomness of the
mechanismsM. Our definitions require the estimators to be unbiased or a valid confidence interval
for any realization of the external randomness.
1We describe survey mechanisms as direct-revelation mechanisms, where date holders report their costs. Any
survey mechanism can be implemented as a posted-price mechanism, where a menu of (price, probability) pairs are
presented and each data holder chooses one from the menu Roth and Schoenebeck [2012], Chen et al. [2018a].
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Definition 2.1 (Unbiased estimator of population mean). An estimator S(M, (c, z)) is an unbiased
estimator of the population mean E[z] = 1n
∑n
i=1 zi if for any fixed sequence (c˜, z˜),
E[S(M, (c˜, z˜)] = E[z],
where the expectation in E[S(M, (c˜, z˜))] is taken over the internal randomness of the mechanisms
M.
Definition 2.2 (Confidence interval of population mean). An estimator S(M, (c, z)) is a confidence
interval for the population mean E[z] = 1n
∑n
i=1 zi with confidence level γ if it is an interval and
for any fixed sequence (c˜, z˜),
Pr (E[z] ∈ S(M, (c˜, z˜))) ≥ γ,
where the randomness is due to the internal randomness of the mechanisms M.
Our goal is to design joint survey and estimation mechanisms, (M, S(M, (c, z)), such that the
estimator S(M, (c, z)) has good statistical performance on the population. For unbiased estimators,
we prefer estimators with smaller variance. For confidence intervals, we prefer ones with smaller
length. However, the performance of a mechanism on a population depends on the correlation
between the population’s cost and data, i.e. the distribution D.2 We hence take a worst-case
analysis approach: measure the performance of a mechanism under worst-case cost-data correlation.
Definition 2.3 (Worst-case variance). Given that the set of data holders’ costs is C = {c1, . . . , cn},
the worst-case variance of a point estimator S(M, (c, z)) is defined as
Var∗(S) = max
D consistent with C
VarD(S(M, (c, z)))
where the maximum is taken over all distributions D consistent with the set of costs C. The
randomness is due to the random order of (c1, z1), . . . , (cn, zn) and the internal randomness of the
mechanism M.
Definition 2.4 (Worst-case expected length). Given that the set of data holders’ costs is C =
{c1, . . . , cn}, the worst-case expected length of a confidence interval S(M, (c, z)) is defined as
L∗(S) = max
D consistent with C
E(|S(M, (c, z))|)
where |S(M, (c, z))| represents the length of the confidence interval. The maximum is taken over
all distributions D consistent with the set of costs C. The randomness is due to the random order
of (c1, z1), . . . , (cn, zn) and the internal randomness of the mechanisms M.
Roth and Schoenebeck [2012] and Chen et al. [2018a] have also considered the design of joint
survey and estimation mechanism for statistical estimation. The main differences between their
model and our model are: (1) they assume the marginal cost distribution is known to the data
analyst, while our data analyst doesn’t have such information, (2) they have the same survey
mechanism for all individuals, while we consider an online setting where the analyst can adaptively
change the survey mechanism, and (3) they only consider the estimation of mean, while we also
investigate the estimation of confidence intervals.
2 For example, consider a mechanism that purchases each agent’s data zi with a constant probability p =
B/
∑n
i=1 ci and payment ci, then outputs 1/(pn) times the sum of all purchased data as an unbiased estimation
of population mean. When z is always equal to 0, the variance will be zero; when z is always equal to 1, the variance
will be (1/p− 1)/n.
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3 Preliminaries
In this section, we first show that we can easily extend known results on one-shot truthful mech-
anisms to achieve truthfulness and individual rationality for a sequence of survey mechanisms M.
Then, we introduce the formulation proposed by Chen et al. [2018a] for obtaining the optimal un-
biased estimator of population mean when the cost distribution is known to the analyst. Later in
Section 5 we will use this known cost case as our benchmark for evaluating the performance of our
optimal unbiased estimator when the cost distribution is unknown. While this optimal unbiased
estimator has been studied by Chen et al. [2018a], their optimal mechanism requires the cost dis-
tribution to be regular. This is often not satisfied when we consider the costs of a finite set of data
holders. We develop the characterization of the optimal unbiased estimator for arbitrary discrete
cost distribution without any regularity assumption. We show that the optimal purchasing rule of
cost-c data is decided by a quantity which we define as regularized virtual costs of the data.
3.1 Truthful and Individually Rational Survey Mechanisms
Since each data holder appears only once in our setting, requiring a sequence of survey mechanisms
to be truthful and individually rational is equivalent to requiring that each (Ai, P i) is truthful and
individually rational, which can be achieved by a straight-forward extension of known results for
truthful mechanisms.
The well-known Myerson’s lemma states that monotonicity is the necessary and sufficient con-
dition for an allocation rule to be truthful with some payment rule.
Lemma 3.1 (Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983]). An allocation rule A(c) is the allocation rule of
some truthful survey mechanism (A(c), P (c)) if and only if A(c) is monotone non-increasing in c.
The following lemmas from Chen et al. [2018a] are analogies of the original Myerson’s Lemma,
which are tailored for discrete cost distributions. Firstly, they show that given a fixed monotone
non-increasing allocation ruleA(c) defined on a discrete cost set {c1, . . . , cm}, there exists an optimal
payment rule P (c) that guarantees truthfulness and individual rationality.
Lemma 3.2 (Chen et al. [2018a], Claim 2 in Section B.1.2). Let A(c) be a monotone non-increasing
allocation rule defined for set {c1, . . . , cm} with c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cm. Define payment rule P (ci) =
ci+
1
A(ci)
∑m
j=i+1A(cj)(cj−cj−1). Then (A(c), P (c)) is truthful and individually rational for all c ∈
{c1, . . . , cm}, and any payment rule P ′(c) that guarantees the truthfulness and individual rationality
of (A(c), P ′(c)) must have P ′(c) ≥ P (c) for all c ∈ {c1, . . . , cm}.
Furthermore for any cost distribution supported on {c1, . . . , cm}, the expected total payment
of (A(c), P (c)), with the optimal payment rule P (c) defined in Lemma 3.2, can be equivalently
represented in a simpler form in terms of virtual costs.
Definition 3.1 (Virtual costs). Let f(c) and F (c) be the PDF and the CDF of a cost distribution
F supported on {c1, . . . , cm} with c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cm. Let c0 = 0. The virtual cost function ψ(c) of this
cost distribution is defined as
ψ(ci) = ci +
ci − ci−1
f(ci)
F (ci−1)
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ m.
We remark that it is very likely that ψ(ci) is not regular, i.e., is not a monotone non-decreasing
function of ci. Consider when the cost distribution is the uniform distribution over a finite set,
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ψ(ci) = ci+ (ci − ci−1) ∗ (i− 1). If ci is very close to ci−1, then ψ(ci) will be roughly equal to ci. If
ci is much larger than ci−1, ψ(ci) can be close to i ∗ ci. So if there exist three consecutive costs, the
difference between the first two costs is large, and the difference between the last two is small, the
virtual costs will very likely be irregular. For example, c1 = 1, c2 = 10, c3 = 11, then ψ(c2) = 19
and ψ(c3) = 13, so ψ is not monotone non-decreasing.
Lemma 3.3 (Chen et al. [2018a], Lemma 10 in Section B.1.2). Let A(c) be a monotone non-
increasing allocation rule defined on set {c1, . . . , cm} with c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cm. Let P (c) be the optimal
truthful and individually rational payment rule defined in Lemma 3.2. When cost follows a dis-
tribution F supported on {c1, . . . , cm}, the expected total payment Ec∼F [A(c)P (c)] is equal to the
expected virtual cost Ec∼F [A(c)ψ(c)] where ψ(c) is the virtual cost function of F .
The above lemmas assume that costs are from a finite discrete set. Our benchmark mechanism
where the analyst already knows all the costs satisfies this assumption. We’ll use the above result
to establish the performance of our benchmark mechanism. However, our mechanisms developed
in this paper for the unknown cost case do not have any restriction on the set of possible costs.
The allocation rules and the payment rules of our mechanisms are first computed on a discrete set
using the above result, and then extended to all other values of cost. We show below that such
extension preserves truthfulness and individual rationality.
Definition 3.2 (Extended allocation rule and payment rule). Given a survey mechanism (Ad, P d)
that is defined on a discrete cost set {c1, . . . , cm} with c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cm. The extended allocation rule
and payment rule A,P are defined as follows
A(c) = Ad(⌈c⌉), P (c) = P d(⌈c⌉), for all c ∈ [0, cm],
where ⌈c⌉ is the minimum cost in {c1, . . . , cm} that is greater than or equal to c.
Lemma 3.4. Let Ad(c) be a monotone non-increasing allocation rule defined on set {c1, . . . , cm}
with c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cm. Let P d(c) be the optimal payment rule defined in Lemma 3.2. Then the
extended allocation rule and payment rule of (Ad, P d) is still truthful and individually rational.
The proof of the lemma can be found in B.1.
3.2 Formulating the Optimal Unbiased Estimator with Known Costs
In this section, we formulate an optimization problem that solves the optimal survey mechanism
for an unbiased estimator when the cost distribution is known, based on the results of Chen et al.
[2018a]. The optimization problem is only slightly different from Chen et al. [2018a] in the objective
function because in our setting, the agents are not i.i.d. drawn from the same distribution but come
as a random permutation. The value of statistic z is assumed to be bounded and without loss of
generality 0 ≤ z ≤ 1.
Horvitz-Thompson Estimator: When we use truthful survey mechanisms M = (A1, P 1), . . . ,
(An, Pn) to purchase the data points, the data of agent i will be collected with probability Ai(ci).
Define
x̂i =
{
zi, with probability A
i(ci)
0, otherwise
to be the observed data point which is set to zero if no purchase is made. Define yi =
x̂i
Ai(ci)
. To
get unbiased estimation, we use Horvitz-Thompson Estimator, which is the unique unbiased linear
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estimator in our setting (see [Roth and Schoenebeck, 2012] for more details),
S(M, (c, z)) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi.
Notice that an unbiased estimator always buys the data points with probability greater than 0, i.e.,
Ai(ci) > 0 for all i and ci. If A
i(ci) = 0, the mechanism will never know the value of zi and thus
cannot be unbiased.
When the cost set C = {c1, . . . , cn} is known to the analyst, the optimal mechanism that uses
the same survey mechanism for all data holders has been derived by Chen et al. [2018a]. They
reduce the mechanism design problem to a min-max optimization problem. The optimal allocation
rule that minimizes the worst-case variance of the Horvitz-Thompson Estimator can be formulated
as the solution of an optimization problem OPT (n,C,B), which is defined as follows,
OPT (n,C,B) = argmin
A
max
z∈[0,1]n
1
n2
(
n∑
i=1
z2i
A(ci)
−
n∑
i=1
z2i
)
(1)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
A(ci)ψ(ci) ≤ B
A(c) is monotone non-increasing in c
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1, ∀c
Here the objective function is changed from the original formulation in Chen et al. [2018a]
so that it is equal to the worst-case variance of the Horvitz-Thompson Estimator in our setting.
According to the law of total variance, Var(S(M, (c, z))) = E[Var(S|(c, z))]+Var(E[S|(c, z)]). Since
the estimator is always unbiased for any order (c, z), the second term is zero. Furthermore, when
conditioning on a sequence, yi =
x̂i
A(ci)
become independent when a fixed allocation rule A is used.
Therefore the variance of the Horvitz-Thompson Estimator is equal to
Var(S(M, (c, z))) =E(c,z)[Var(S|(c, z))] = E(c,z)
[
1
n2
n∑
i=1
Var (yi|(c, z))
]
=
1
n2
· E(c,z)
[
n∑
i=1
E[y2i |(c, z)] − E[yi|(c, z)]2
]
.
For any arriving sequence (c, z),
∑n
i=1 E[y
2
i |(c, z)] − E[yi|(c, z)]2 stays the same, which is equal
to
∑n
i=1
z2i
A(ci)
−∑ni=1 z2i . Therefore by maximizing over z, we get the worst-case variance of the
Horvitz-Thompson estimator
max
z∈[0,1]n
1
n2
(
n∑
i=1
z2i
A(ci)
−
n∑
i=1
z2i
)
.
The last constraint 0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1 makes sure that A is an allocation rule of a survey mechanism.
The second constraint is the sufficient and necessary condition for A to be the allocation rule of
a truthful mechanism. The first constraint guarantees expected budget feasibility according to
Lemma 3.3, where ψ(c) is the virtual cost function.
To simplify the analysis, in this work we will use an approximation of the above optimization
problem, which is defined as APPROX(n,C,B) by removing the second term of the objective
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function of OPT (n,C,B),
APPROX(n,C,B) = argmin
A
max
z∈[0,1]n
n∑
i=1
z2i
A(ci)
(2)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
A(ci)ψ(ci) ≤ B
A(c) is monotone non-increasing in c
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1, ∀c
Lemma 3.5. The worst-case variance of APPROX(n,C,B) is no more than the worst-case vari-
ance of OPT (n,C,B) plus 1n .
Proof. As zi ∈ [0, 1], the second term of the objective function of OPT (n,C,B) ≤ 1/n.
3.3 Characterization of the Optimal Unbiased Estimator
The characterization of the optimal unbiased estimator when the cost distribution is known has been
studied in both Chen et al. [2018a] and Roth and Schoenebeck [2012]. But neither of the solutions
can be directly applied to our problem. Roth and Schoenebeck [2012] require the PDF of the cost
distribution to be piecewise differentiable except on a measure zero set, and Chen et al. [2018a]
assume that the cost distribution is regular, i.e., the virtual cost function ψ(c) is monotone non-
decreasing in c. Although the optimization problem (2) has a convex objective function and thus can
be solved efficiently by the convex optimization algorithms (see Boyd and Vandenberghe [2004]),
the closed-form solution is still non-trivial to derive. Below we give the exact characterization of
the optimal solution, which has a very simple form and will further be used to derive the optimal
confidence interval mechanism: the optimal allocation rule Ai(c) is inversely proportional to the
square root of the regularized virtual cost of c, which is defined as follows,
Definition 3.3 (Regularized virtual costs). For a discrete uniform distribution supported on
{c1, . . . , cm} with c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cm and its virtual costs function ψ(c1), . . . , ψ(cm). For every i ≤ k,
let Avg(i, k) be the average of ψ(ci), . . . , ψ(ck). We define regularized virtual cost φ(ci) as follows
φ(ci) = max{ψ′(c1), . . . , ψ′(ci)},
ψ′(ci) = min
k:k≥i
Avg(i, k).
The form of the regularized virtual costs is very similar to the ironed virtual value used in
revenue-maximizing auction design Myerson [1981]. The idea is to replace the exact virtual cost
(value) with the average virtual cost (value) on an interval that has non-regular virtual cost (value).
But our proof is different because the underlying optimization problem is not the same.
Theorem 3.1. The optimal solution of APPROX(n,C,B) is
A(c(k)) = min
1, λ√φ(c(k))
 , for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
where φ(c) is the regularized virtual cost function when the cost distribution is the uniform distri-
bution over C, and λ is chosen such that the budget constraint is satisfied with equality
n∑
k=1
A(c(k))ψ(c(k)) = B.
10
The value of λ can be computed using binary search within time O(log |C|).
The proof of the theorem can be found in C.1, in which we demonstrate some properties of the
regularized virtual cost function, and show that the KKT conditions are satisfied because of these
properties.
4 Optimal Confidence Interval with Known Costs
In this section, we design purchasing mechanisms to get the best confidence interval of the statistic
when the cost distribution is known to the analyst at the beginning of the survey. In this case,
the optimal mechanism needs to find the optimal trade-off of the bias and the variance in order
to minimize the length of the interval. We consider the class of confidence intervals that are
defined around the sample mean, and the length of which is decided by a bias term and the sample
variance. We will first introduce an extended survey mechanism that allows biased estimation, e.g.,
by ignoring the high-cost data. Then again we formulate an optimization problem and present the
characterization of the optimal solution.
Before introducing the new estimator, we first show how to convert our unbiased estimator
into a confidence interval. In this work, we use the most classic approach to construct confidence
interval based on sample mean and sample variance.
Construct confidence interval using unbiased estimator: Consider an unbiased estimator
S(M, (c, z)) that uses survey mechanism M = (A,P), and we want to construct a confidence
interval for E[z] = 1n
∑n
i=1 zi. Again we use
x̂i =
{
zi, with probability A
i(ci)
0, otherwise
to denote the observed data point and define yi =
x̂i
Ai(ci)
. Notice that the random variables y1, . . . , yn
are not independent since the allocation ruleAi can depend on c1, . . . , ci−1. But if we consider a fixed
realization (c˜, z˜), the mechanisms (A1, P 1), . . . , (An, Pn) will also be fixed. Then y1, . . . , yn become
independent, because when the probability of purchasing each data point A1(c1), . . . , A
n(cn) is fixed,
whether to purchase each data point or not is independently decided. Therefore given a confidence
level γ, we can construct a confidence interval of the expected mean E
[∑
yi/n
∣∣(c˜, z˜)] using the
sample mean
∑n
i=1 yi/n and sample variance σ̂
2 =
∑n
i=1 (yi −
∑n
i=1 yi/n)
2 /(n − 1) according to
Bernstein’s inequality (see more details in A.1):[
n∑
i=1
yi/n− αγ√
n
· σ̂,
n∑
i=1
yi/n+
αγ√
n
· σ̂
]
where αγ is a constant that is chosen to achieve confidence level γ. When the estimator is unbiased,
E
[∑
yi/n
∣∣(c˜, z˜)] = E[z] for all (c˜, z˜), this interval is just a confidence interval of E[z] with confidence
level γ.
4.1 Confidence Interval and Bias-variance Tradeoff
This “unbiased” confidence interval does not necessarily have the minimum length. Observe that
a small portion of high-cost data can drastically increase the variance of the unbiased estimator
as A(c) must be small. We can allow the mechanism to simply ignore these data points, i.e., to
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have Ai(ci) = 0 for some i and set yi = 0. This can probably reduce the variance of the estimator.
However, doing so causes the estimator to be biased. Therefore, we need to increase the length of
the confidence interval to compensate for this added bias.
For this reason, we extend the standard survey mechanism to incorporate biased estimation.
The mechanism ignores a data point with probability U(c). The added bias can be represented
as a function of U(c). Although the mechanisms now have a new component U(c), the results in
Section 3 can nevertheless be applied by seeing (1− U(c))A(c) as the allocation rule.
Survey mechanisms that allow bias: We add a new component U = (U1, . . . , Un) into our
allocation rule to allow biased estimation, where each U i is a function of reported cost ci. A
mechanism that allows bias consists of (A,U,P). When a data point with cost ci comes at time
i, the mechanism first flips a coin Ûi to decide whether to ignore this data point or not, and the
probability of Ûi being 1 (which means ignoring the data) is equal to U
i(ci). If the data is ignored,
a bias term will be added into the final estimation to compensate the error. If Ûi = 0, then the
mechanism purchases the data with probability Ai(ci) > 0 and pays P
i(ci) if the data is purchased.
Then the observed data x̂i follows
x̂i =

zi, with probability (1− U i(ci))Ai(ci)
0, with probability (1− U i(ci))(1 −Ai(ci))
ignored, with probability U i(ci).
We re-define yi as
yi =
{
x̂i
Ai(ci)
, if Ûi = 0
0, if Ûi = 1.
Then for a fixed arriving sequence (c˜, z˜), the bias of estimator
∑
yi/n is equal to
err = E[z]− 1
n
n∑
i=1
E[yi|(c˜, z˜)] = 1
n
n∑
i=1
zi − 1
n
n∑
i=1
(1− Ûi)z˜i = 1
n
n∑
i=1
z˜i · Ûi.
Notice that this bias is not observable because the mechanism does not know the z˜i that is not
purchased. But since z˜i is between 0 and 1 and we use worst-case analysis in this work, we can
just assume z˜i equals its worst-case value 1. (This can be seen more clearly in our formulation of
the optimization problem in the next section.) Then the confidence interval of E[z] with confidence
level γ can be constructed as follows[
n∑
i=1
yi/n − αγ√
n
· σ̂,
n∑
i=1
yi/n+
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ûi +
αγ√
n
· σ̂
]
where Ûi is the indicator of whether the i-th data point is ignored and σ̂
2 is the sample variance of
y1, . . . , yn.
For convenience, in the rest of the paper, we write U ic = U
i(c) for short, and in cases when the
costs are indexed as c1, . . . , cn or c(1), . . . , c(n), we use U
i
j to represent U
i(cj) or U
i(c(j)).
4.2 Formulation of the Optimal Confidence Interval
We formulate a min-max optimization problem that approximately solves the optimal allocation
rule. The expected length of the interval we construct is 2 · αγ√
n
·E[σ̂]+E[err]. Since the expectation
of sample standard deviation E[σ̂] is difficult to compute, we estimate E[σ̂] with
√
E
∑n
i=1 y
2
i /n.
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When 0 ≤ E[yi] ≤ 1, the difference between E[σ̂] and
√
E
∑n
i=1 y
2
i /n is no more than 1 + O(1/n)
(see A.2 for more details).
The approximate expected length of the confidence interval can thus be written into a function
of A and U and z
2 · αγ√
n
·
√√√√E n∑
i=1
y2i /n+ E[err] = 2 ·
αγ√
n
·
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(1− Ui)z2i
A(ci)
+
1
n
n∑
i=1
zi · Ui.
Then we only need to take maximum over all possible z to get the worst-case expected length.
Therefore, suppose the underlying cost set is C = {c(1), . . . , c(n)} with c(1) ≤ · · · ≤ c(n), then
the approximately optimal allocation rule (A∗, U∗) can be again formulated as the solution of
OPTCI(n,C,B), which is defined as
OPTCI(n,C,B) = argmin
A,U
max
z∈[0,1]n
β ·
√√√√ 1
n
·
n∑
i=1
(1− Ui)z2i
A(c(i))
+
∑n
i=1 zi · Ui
n
(3)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
(1− Ui) ·A(c(i))ψ(c(i)) ≤ B
(1− Uc)A(c) is monotone non-increasing in c
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Uc ≤ 1, ∀c
where β = 2 · αγ√
n
.
Lemma 4.1. Let L∗ be the value of the objective function (3) when A∗ and U∗ is used. ( L∗ is an
approximation of the worst-case expected length of the confidence interval produced by (A∗, U∗). )
Then the difference between L∗ and the worst-case expected length of the actual optimal confidence
interval MIN is no more than 2β(1 +O(1/n)) = 4 · αγ√
n
(1 +O(1/n)).
The optimal solution of (3) is still difficult to solve. But if we replace the objective function by
the sum of the squares of its two terms
APPROXCI(n,C,B) = argmin
A,U
max
z∈[0,1]n
β2 · 1
n
·
n∑
i=1
(1− Ui)z2i
A(c(i))
+
(∑n
i=1 zi · Ui
n
)2
(4)
the optimal solution can be computed efficiently. The optimization problem with the new objective
function will give a 2-approximation of (3) because a2+ b2 ≤ (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2+ b2) (see more details
in the last paragraph of D.4).
Lemma 4.2. APPROXCI(n,C,B) will give a 2-approximation of OPTCI(n,C,B).
In this work, we consider the bias-variance tradeoff in the setting of getting the shortest con-
fidence interval. By changing the value of β in the objective function, our mechanism can also
be applied to other estimation tasks that involve the bias-variance tradeoff. For example, if we
want to minimize the mean squared error of the output estimator, or equivalently the risk of the
estimator when the loss function is the squared error function, we can set β = 1 and apply the
same mechanism.
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4.3 Characterization of the Optimal Confidence Interval
So how should the optimal mechanism look like when some data can simply be ignored? It is natural
to believe that the optimal mechanism should ignore the data points with the highest costs. This is
corroborated in the following theorem that the optimal mechanism ignores all the data points with
regularized virtual costs above a threshold H, and purchases (with probability) all the data points
below the threshold. The characterization of the optimal A remains the same as the unbiased case.
Theorem 4.1. The optimal solution of APPROXCI(n,C,B) is as follows:
Uj =

0, if φ(c(j)) < H
p ∈ (0, 1], if φ(c(j)) = H
1, if φ(c(j)) > H
A(c(j)) = min
1, λ√φ(c(j))

where p is a constant in (0, 1], and φ(c) is the regularized virtual cost function (Definition 3.3)
when the cost distribution is the uniform distribution over C, and λ is chosen such that the budget
constraint is satisfied with equality. The value of λ and H can be computed using binary search
over set C within time O(log |C|).
The theorem is proved in D.1. The optimal H can be found by binary search because it can
be proved that the objective function is a convex function of M =
∑n
j=1 Uj , when A is optimized
after U is decided. Let g(M) be the the optimal value of the first term β2 · 1n
∑n
j=1
1−Uj
A(c(j))
when∑n
j=1 Uj is set to M . Then the objective function is just g(M) +
(
M
n
)2
. The second term
(
M
n
)2
is
a convex function of M . We prove that g(M) is also a convex function of M .
Lemma 4.3. The function g(M) is a convex function of M . Furthermore, let AM be an optimal
allocation rule when
∑n
j=1 Uj =M and let c(r) be the largest cost that is not ignored with probability
1. Then for non-integer M that has AM (c(r)) < 1,
∂g(M)
∂M
= −β2 · 2
n
· 1
AM (c(r))
.
which is an non-decreasing function of M .
Therefore the optimal H can be found by binary search over the optimal M such that ∂g(M)∂M +
2M
n2 ≥ 0 on the right and
∂g(M)
∂M +
2M
n2 ≤ 0 on the left. The complete proof of the lemma is in D.2.
5 Online Mechanisms
We now move to the case when the cost distribution is unknown at the beginning. The idea of our
mechanism is very simple: at time i, use the approximately optimal allocation rule APPROX(·)
as if (1) there are i data holders with costs c1, . . . , ci−1 and {C}, and (2) the analyst’s total budget
for these i data points is proportional to
√
i, so that the average budget for each data point is
proportional to 1√
i
. So the average budget is a decreasing function of i, which means we use more
budget in the earlier stages when the estimation of the cost distribution is not accurate. We prove
that for both of the unbiased estimator problem and the confidence interval problem, such an
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Mechanism 1: Online Mechanism Outline
for i = 1,. . . ,n do
1) Let Ai = APPROX
(
i, Ti, ξnB
√
i
)
be the optimal allocation rule when there are i data
holders with costs
Ti = {c1, . . . , ci−1, C},
and the total budget for these i data points is ξnB
√
i.
2) Ask agent i to report cost ci and purchase the data using (an approximation of) (A
i, P i),
where P i is computed as in Lemma 3.2.
end for
Aggregate all collected to output an estimator.
online mechanism will only be worse for a constant factor compared to the optimal mechanisms
OPT (n,C,B) that knows the cost distribution at the beginning.
The outline of our online mechanisms (for both the unbiased estimator and the confidence
interval) is given in Mechanism 1.
We will describe the specifics of the online mechanism for the unbiased estimation of mean and
the confidence interval respectively in the next two parts. For each, we’ll prove that the online
mechanism is optimal within a constant factor. We sketch the high-level idea of our proofs as
follows.
1. We compare both of our online algorithm and the benchmark with an intermediate mechanism
(A′,i, P ′,i) = APPROX
(
i, {c1, . . . , ci−1, ci}, ξnB
√
i
)
at each step i. This intermediate mechanism (A′,i, P ′,i) is basically the same as (Ai, P i), but
is “one-step-ahead”. (A′, P ′) is the optimal mechanism when the same amount of budget is
assigned, but knows an additional piece of information, the value of ci, beforehand.
2. We show that the difference between (A′,i, P ′,i) and (Ai, P i) is no more than a constant factor.
This is mainly due to the similarity of (A′,i, P ′,i)and (Ai, P i). Since the two mechanisms only
differ in one element in the cost set, the regularized virtual costs are not going to change a
lot, and so is the allocation rule.
3. Then we prove that if (A′,i, P ′,i) is used at each round, the performance of the output estimator
is no worse than a constant times the benchmark. Our budget allocation method and the
random arriving order play crucial roles here. We give the basic idea of our budget allocation
rule below.
A simplified modeling of the budget allocation. We’re able to show that if we allocate
average budget bi at round i, the “loss” (of performance) occurred by our mechanism at round i
is bounded by r·B
i·bi times the “loss” occurred by the benchmark A
∗, where r is a constant. So the
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optimal budget allocation is essentially the following problem
min
bi
r · B
n∑
i=1
1
i · bi
s.t.
n∑
i=1
bi ≤ B,
bi ≥ 0.
which gives bi ∝ 1√i . In addition, it can be shown that the total “loss” of our mechanism is no
more than a constant times the total “loss” of the benchmark when this budget allocation rule is
applied.
Optimality of the online mechanisms. Our mechanisms are proved to be optimal within
constant factors. But it remains open whether our constant factors are optimal. One possible
method to improve the constant is to only collect agents’ costs without purchasing any data at
the beginning and start collecting data after a more accurate cost estimation is acquired. But
such a method would weaken the incentive guarantee for the agents to report their true costs:
if the agents’ report costs are not going to affect their rewards, why would they report the true
costs? It is also challenging to analyze the performance of such a method. As we’ve shown in
Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1, the optimal allocation rule is defined by the regularized virtual
costs. It may not be easy to estimate the regularized virtual costs because (1) the regularized
virtual cost function is a global property of the cost distribution; (2) the value of the virtual cost
function is very sensitive to the PDF of the cost distribution, which appears in the denominator
of the second term: f(ci)/(ci − ci−1) in ψ(ci) = ci + 1f(ci)/(ci−ci−1)F (ci−1) (see Definition 3.1). The
analysis of our online mechanisms is possible because the intermediate mechanism (A′,i, P ′,i) only
differs from the optimal mechanism (Ai, P i) in one element in the cost set, which doesn’t affect
the regularized virtual costs much. However, our analysis cannot be easily extended to analyze
the performance of the above mentioned alternate method as its difficult to bound the estimation
error of the regularized virtual costs. The performance of this alternate method remains an open
question.
5.1 Unbiased Estimator
We first introduce the benchmark to which we compare our online algorithm.
Definition 5.1. Let c(1) ≤ · · · ≤ c(n) be the n data holders’ costs ordered from smallest to largest.
Suppose there is one more data holder with cost C. We define the benchmark (A∗, P ∗) to be the
mechanism that purchases data from these n+1 data holders, and minimizes the worst case variance
when it knows the set of costs {c(1), c(2), . . . , c(n), C} at the beginning.
A∗ = OPT (n+ 1, {c(1), c(2), . . . , c(n), C}, B). (5)
This additional cost C can be interpreted as the loss of unknown upper bound of the possible
cost. When the cost distribution is known, the mechanism knows the exact maximum cost c(n),
and thus the optimal mechanism will never have a positive probability to buy a data point with
cost higher than c(n). But when c(n) is unknown, the mechanism always has to buy any data point
(with cost under C) with a positive probability.
We show that our online mechanism satisfies all three constraints and its worst-case variance is
roughly within a constant times the benchmark.
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Theorem 5.1. If we use Mechanism 1 with
• ξn = 14√n .
• At round i, use the extended allocation rule and payment rule (Definition 3.2) of (Ai, P i),
where
Ai = APPROX
(
i, Ti, ξnB
√
i
)
and P i is computed as in Lemma 3.2. Let the collected data be x̂i.
• Output unbiased estimator S = 1n
∑n
i=1 yi =
1
n
∑n
i=1
x̂i
Ai(ci)
at last.
Then the mechanism satisfies (1) truthfulness and individually rationality, (2) the expected total
spending is no more than B = nB, and (3) for any cost distribution {c1, . . . , cn} the worst-case
variance of the final estimator S is no more than
16 ·
((
1 +
1
n
)2
·Var∗(A∗) + 1
n
+
1
n
√
n
· 1
A∗(C)
)
,
where A∗ is the benchmark defined in Definition 5.1.
Discussion: We have the factor
(
1 + 1n
)2
in the first term of our upper bound because the
benchmark mechanism has one more data point. It is no more than 4 when n ≥ 1 and goes to 1
when n gets large. The second additive term 1n is due to our estimation of Var(S) by E[S
2]. We
know that Var∗(A∗) is roughly 1n+1 · E[ 1A∗(c) ]. So when the problem is non-trivial, we should have
the average 1A∗(c) much larger than 1, and
1
n will be small compared to Var
∗(A∗). The last additive
term 1
n
√
n
· 1
A∗(C)
is dominated by 1n . It is only comparable to Var
∗(A∗) when
√
n ≤ 1
A∗(C)·E[ 1
A∗(c)
]
The complete proof can be found in Appendix C.3.
5.2 Confidence Interval
Our benchmark for the online mechanism is again the optimal mechanism that knows the cost
distribution at the beginning and uses a single optimal mechanism (A∗, U∗, P ∗) throughout the
survey. We still add an additional cost C into the underlying cost set of the benchmark mechanism,
in order to make the comparison possible without knowing the exact maximum cost.
Definition 5.2. Let c(1) ≤ · · · ≤ c(n) be the n data holders’ costs ordered from smallest to largest.
Suppose there is one more data holder with cost C. We define the benchmark (A∗, U∗, P ∗) to be
the mechanism that purchases data from these n + 1 data holders, and minimizes the worst case
variance when it knows the set of costs {c(1), c(2), . . . , c(n), C} at the beginning.
A∗, U∗ = OPTCI(n+ 1, {c(1), c(2), . . . , c(n), C}, B). (6)
Theorem 5.2. If we use Mechanism 1 with
• ξn = 116√n .
• At round i, compute
(Ai, U i) = APPROXCI(i, Ti, ξnB
√
i).
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Let 1
(
U i(c) ≥ 12
)
be the rule that completely ignores data with cost c if U i(c) ≥ 12 , and never
ignores the data if U i(c) < 12 . Then the mechanism purchases agent i’s data using the extended
allocation and payment rule of (
Ai,1
(
U i(c) ≥ 1
2
)
, P i
)
,
where P i is computed as in Lemma 3.2. Let the collected data be x̂i.
• Output confidence interval[
n∑
i=1
yi/n− αγ√
n
· σ̂,
n∑
i=1
yi/n+
∑n
i=1 Ûi
n
+
αγ√
n
· σ̂
]
,
where yi =
x̂i
Ai(ci)
and σ̂2 is the sample variance of y1, . . . , yn, and Ûi represents whether the
i-th data point is ignored or not.
Then the mechanism is (1) truthful in expectation and individually rational; (2) satisfies the budget
constraint B = nB in expectation; (3) and the for any cost distribution {c1, . . . , cn}, the worst-case
expected length of the output confidence interval is no more than
8
√
10 · L∗ + 2
√
10√
n
+ o
(
1√
n
)
,
where L∗ is the approximate worst-case expected length of the benchmark as defined in Lemma 4.1.
Corollary 5.1. The worst-case expected length of our mechanism’s output confidence interval is
no more than
8
√
10 ·MIN + 2
√
10 + 32
√
10 · αγ√
n
+ o
(
1√
n
)
,
where MIN is the worst-case expected length of the optimal confidence interval estimator.
Discussion: As we show in the previous section, L∗ is roughly 1√
n
·
(
2αγ
√
E[1−U
∗
c
A∗(c) ] +
√
n · E[U∗c ]
)
.
If the problem is non-trivial, we should have 1√
n
dominated by L∗. The complete proof can be found
in D.4.
6 Discussions
In this work, we restrict our estimators to use only the collected data. When the data are correlated
with the costs, the data analyst may gradually learn the cost-data correlation based on the collected
pairs. This means that if a data holder arrives and reports his cost, the data analyst may form
a prediction for his data based on his reported cost and the learned cost-data correlation, even if
the data is not collected. This leads to an interesting open question: can the final estimation be
improved if the data analyst makes use of such predicted data?
Allowing the data analyst to leverage on the cost-data correlation brings up an additional level
of challenge when the data holders care about the privacy of their data. Such data holders may
hesitate to report their costs, because reporting the cost itself reveals some information about his
data. This makes it more challenging to achieve truthfulness in design an online mechanism.
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Another open problem is whether it is possible to do better than the worst-case analysis. The
optimality of our mechanism is based on the worst-case cost-data correlation. When the designer
can gradually learn the cost-data correlation, is it possible to adjust the purchasing mechanism
accordingly so that it achieves optimality with respect to the actual cost-data correlation?
More generally, it would be interesting to develop mechanisms for other more complicated
statistical estimation tasks, such as hypothesis testing.
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A Concentration Bounds
A.1 Empirical Bernstein’s Inequality
We show how to construct confidence interval using sample mean and sample variance of yi’s.
Lemma A.1 (Maurer and Pontil [2009]). Let X1, . . . ,Xn be independent random variables taking
their values in [0,M ]. Consider the sample expectation µ̂ and sample variance σ̂2 defined respectively
by µ̂ =
∑
iXi/n and σ̂
2 =
∑n
i=1(Xi − µ̂)2/(n − 1). Then with probability at least 1− γ,
|µ̂− Eµ̂| ≤ σ̂
√
2 ln(4/γ)
n
+
7M ln(4/γ)
3n
.
As we proved in the main text, y1 =
x̂1
A1(c1)
, . . . , yn =
x̂n
An(cn)
become independent when con-
ditioning on a realization of arriving sequence (c˜, z˜), and when the estimator is unbiased, for any
realization (c˜, z˜), E[
∑
i yi/n] =
∑
i zi/n = E[z]. Therefore by the above lemma, with probability at
least 1− γ, ∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
yi/n − E[z]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ σ̂
√
2 ln(4/γ)
n
+
7M ln(4/γ)
3n
,
whereM = maxi yi. Therefore the following interval is a confidence interval of E[z] with confidence
level γ, [
n∑
i=1
yi/n− αγ√
n
· σ̂,
n∑
i=1
yi/n+
αγ√
n
· σ̂
]
where αγ =
√
2 ln(4/γ) + 7M ln(4/γ)
3
√
n·σ̂ . Notice that the second term in α,
7M ln(4/γ)
3
√
n·σ̂ is not a constant.
But since we estimate σ̂2 with
∑
y2i /n (see Section 4.2) when computing the optimal confidence
interval mechanism,
M√
n · σ̂ =
maxi yi
√
n ·
√∑n
i=1 y
2
i /n
≤ maxi yi√∑n
i=1 y
2
i
≤ 1,
we can just assume that αγ is a constant in the range of
√
2 ln(4/γ) to
√
2 ln(4/γ) + 7 ln(4/γ)3 when
solving the optimization problem.
A.2 Estimation of Sample Standard Deviation
We show that when 0 ≤ E[yi] ≤ 1, the difference between E[σ̂] and
√
E
∑n
i=1 y
2
i /n is no more than
1 +O(1/n), where σ̂2 is the sample variance of y1, . . . , yn.
We first show that the difference between E[σ̂2] and 1n ·
∑n
i=1 E[y
2
i ] is no more than 1. Because
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yi’s are independent conditioned on c1, . . . , cn,
E[σ̂2|c1, . . . , cn] =E
 n∑
i=1
(
yi −
n∑
i=1
yi/n
)2
/(n − 1)
∣∣∣c1, . . . , cn

=
1
n− 1 · E
 n∑
i=1
y2i −
2
n
n∑
i=1
yi
n∑
i=1
yi + n ·
(
n∑
i=1
yi/n
)2 ∣∣∣c1, . . . , cn

=
1
n− 1 · E
 n∑
i=1
y2i −
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
yi
)2 ∣∣∣c1, . . . , cn

=
1
n− 1 · E
 n∑
i=1
y2i −
1
n
n∑
i=1
y2i −
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
yiyj
∣∣∣c1, . . . , cn

=
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ]−
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
E[yi|c1, . . . , cn]E[yj |c1, . . . , cn]
∈
[
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ]− 1,
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ]
]
Therefore √√√√ 1
n
·
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ]− 1 ≤
√
E[σ̂2|c1, . . . , cn] ≤
√√√√ 1
n
·
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ]
for all c1, . . . , cn. It has been shown (e.g. in Gurland and Tripathi [1971]) that the difference be-
tween E[σ̂|c1, . . . , cn] and
√
E[σ̂2|c1, . . . , cn] decreases as sample size grows, dropping off as O(1/n).
Therefore √√√√ 1
n
·
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ]− 1−O(1/n) ≤ E[σ̂] ≤
√√√√ 1
n
·
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ].
The difference between E[σ̂] and
√
E
∑n
i=1 y
2
i /n is no more than 1 +O(1/n).
B Truthfulness and Virtual Cost Function
B.1 Extended Allocation Rule and Payment Rule
We apply the well-known Myerson’s lemma to prove Lemma 3.4.
Lemma B.1 (Myerson and Satterthwaite [1983]). A survey mechanism (A(c), P (c)) defined on
c ∈ [0, C ] is truthful and pays 0 when A(c) = 0 if and only if
• A(c) is a monotone non-increasing function of c.
• P (c) = c+ 1A(c) ·
∫ C
c A(v) dv.
Let (Ad, P d) be a truthful and individually rational survey mechanism defined on a discrete cost
set {c1, . . . , cm} with c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cm. Then when we use the extended allocation rule and payment
rule
A(c) = Ad(⌈c⌉), P (c) = P d(⌈c⌉), for all c ∈ [0, cm].
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The allocation rule A(c) must be monotone non-increasing because Ad must be monotone non-
increasing. Suppose ⌈c⌉ = ci, then
P (c) = P d(ci) =ci +
1
A(ci)
m∑
j=i+1
A(cj)(cj − cj−1)
=c+ (ci − c) + 1
A(c)
m∑
j=i+1
A(cj)(cj − cj−1)
=c+ (ci − c) + 1
A(c)
m∑
j=i+1
∫ cj
cj−1
A(cj) dv
=c+
1
A(c)
·
∫ cm
c
A(v) dv,
which is just the payment rule that satisfies the second condition of the Myerson’s lemma. Therefore
(A(c), P (c)) is truthful. It is also individually rational because we always have P (c) ≥ c.
B.2 Virtual Cost Function
The following results on the virtual cost function (Definition 3.1) will be used in our proofs.
Lemma B.2. Let ψ(c) be the virtual cost function of the discrete uniform distribution over set
T = {c1, . . . , cn}. Let Ti be an arbitrary subset of T with length i and let ψi(c) be the virtual cost
function of the discrete uniform distribution over set Ti. Then for any non-increasing allocation
rule A(c), ∑
c∈Ti
A(c)ψi(c) ≤
∑
c∈T
A(c)ψ(c).
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn and Ti = {cp1 , . . . , cpi}. Then according to
the definition of ψ(c) and ψi(c), for all 1 ≤ k ≤ i,
pk∑
j=pk−1+1
ψ(cj) =
pk∑
j=pk−1+1
j · cj − (j − 1)cj−1
=(pk − pk−1) · cpk + pk−1 · (cpk − cpk−1)
≥cpk + (k − 1)(cpk − cpk−1)
=ψi(cpk).
since pk − pk−1 ≥ 1 and pk−1 ≥ k − 1.
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For all cj ∈ T , define ⌈cj⌉ to be the smallest cost in Ti that is greater than or equal to cj .
∑
c∈Ti
A(c)ψi(c) =
i∑
k=1
A(cpk)ψ
i(cpk)
≤
i∑
k=1
A(cpk)
 pk∑
j=pk−1+1
ψ(cj)

=
n∑
j=1
A(⌈cj⌉)ψ(cj)
≤
n∑
j=1
A(cj)ψ(cj)
since A is monotone non-increasing,
C Proofs for Optimal Unbiased Estimator
In this section, we give the proofs for the optimal online unbiased estimator. In Section C.1, we
characterize the optimal A by the use of the Lagrangian function and the KKT conditions. Since the
objective function of our optimization problem is convex, we prove the optimality by constructing
the dual variables that satisfy the KKT conditions with our primal solution. This is based on some
properites of the regularized virtual cost function φ, which is presented at the beginning of the
section. In Section C.2, we prove some lemmas that will be used in Section C.3 when we show the
budget feasibility and the performance of our online mechanism.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We first prove the following properties of the regularized virtual cost function φ when compared
with the non-regularized virtual cost function ψ.
Lemma C.1. For a discrete uniform distribution supported on {c1, . . . , cm} with c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cm.
Let ψ be its virtual cost function and φ be the regularized virtual cost function. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
let Ii be the set of all the j that has φ(cj) = φ(ci). Then
1. φ(c) is a non-decreasing function of c.
2.
∑
j∈Ii φ(cj) =
∑
j∈Ii ψ(cj).
3.
∑i
j=1 φ(cj) ≤
∑i
j=1 ψ(cj) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. If φ(ci) 6= φ(ci+1) then
∑i
j=1 φ(cj) =∑i
j=1 ψ(cj).
Proof. Define Avg(i, k) as the average of ψ(i), . . . , ψ(k), i.e., Avg(i, k) = 1k−i+1
∑k
j=i ψ(cj). Recall
that the definition of φ(ci) is as follows
φ(ci) = max{ψ′(c1), . . . , ψ′(ci)}, (7)
ψ′(ci) = Avg(i, Ri),
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where Ri is the k to the right of i that minimizes Avg(i, k), i.e.,
Ri = arg min
k:k≥i
Avg(i, k).
If there are multiple k’s that achieve the minimum, without loss of generality let Ri be the maximum
of them.
We prove the following properties of the intervals [i, Ri].
Claim C.1. The intervals [1, R1], [2, R2], . . . , [m,Rm] will not partially intersect, i.e., if i < j and
j ≤ Ri then Rj ≤ Ri.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose i < j ≤ Ri < Rj, then since
Avg(j,Ri) ≤ Avg(i, j)
Avg(j,Ri) ≥ Avg(j,Rj)
it satisfies that
Avg(i, Ri) ≥ Avg(i, Rj),
which contradicts the definition of Ri.
Claim C.2. For any j that is contained in [i, Ri], it always holds that Avg(j,Rj) ≤ Avg(i, Ri), or
equivalently ψ′(cj) ≤ ψ′(ci).
Proof. First by Claim C.1, [j,Rj ] ⊆ [i, Ri]. Then the claim can also be proved by contradiction.
Assume there exists i < j ≤ Rj ≤ Ri that has Avg(j,Rj) > Avg(i, Ri). Then since Rj minimizes
the average Avg(j, k) over all k ≥ j, we must also have Avg(j,Ri) > Avg(i, Ri). But Avg(j,Ri) >
Avg(i, Ri) will immediately lead to Avg(i, j − 1) < Avg(i, Ri), as
Avg(i, j − 1) ∗ (j − i) +Avg(j,Ri) ∗ (Ri − j + 1)
=Avg(i, Ri) ∗ (j − i) +Avg(i, Ri) ∗ (Ri − j + 1),
which is contradictory to the definition of Ri that Ri minimizes Avg(i, k) over all k ≥ i.
Claim C.3. If an interval [i, Ri] is not contained in any other intervals. Then for any j < i, it
holds that Avg(j,Rj) < Avg(i, Ri), or equivalently ψ
′(j) < ψ′(i).
Proof. By Claim C.1, Rj < i. We then prove by induction. First for j = i−1, by the definition of Rj ,
we must have Avg(j,Rj) = Avg(j, j) < Avg(i, Ri), or equivalently ψ
′(j) < ψ′(i). Now suppose the
claim holds for any j ∈ [k+1, i−1], then for j = k, it must hold that Avg(j,Rj) < ψ′(Rj+1) ≤ ψ′(i).
Again this is because Rj minimizes Avg(j,Rj).
With the three results above, our lemma can be proved as follows:
(1): According to definition (7), φ is non-decreasing.
(2): Consider a fixed i, let L be the minimal j that has Rj ≥ i, in other words let [L,RL] be the
maximal interval that contains i. Then by Claim C.2 and Claim C.3,
φ(ci) = max{ψ′(c1), . . . , ψ′(ci)} = ψ′(cL) = Avg(L,RL).
The same holds for any other i ∈ [L,RL]. By Claim C.3, for any j < L,
φ(cj) = max{ψ′(c1), . . . , ψ′(cj)} < ψ′(cL).
And similarly for any j > RL, ψ
′(cj) > ψ′(cL). Therefore Ii = {L, . . . , RL} and
∑
j∈Ii φ(cj) =
Avg(L,RL) ∗ (RL − L+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ii ψ(cj).
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(3): Consider a fixed i, let Ii = {L, . . . , RL} as proved in (2). If φ(ci) 6= φ(ci+1), then imust be the
right end point of Ii. Then by summing over all Ij to the left of Ii, we get the equality
∑i
j=1 φ(cj) =∑i
j=1 ψ(cj). Otherwise we have
∑L−1
j=1 φ(cj) =
∑L−1
j=1 ψ(cj) and
∑i
j=L ψ(cj) = Avg(L, i) ∗ (i− L+
1) ≥ Avg(L,RL) ∗ (i− L+ 1) =
∑i
j=L φ(cj).
Now we prove the theorem: the solution of
A∗ =argmin
A
max
z∈[0,1]n
n∑
k=1
z2k
A(c(k))
(8)
s.t.
n∑
k=1
A(c(k))ψ(c(k)) ≤ B
A(c(k)) ≥ A(c(k+1)),∀k
0 ≤ A(c(k)) ≤ 1, ∀k
is A∗(c(j)) = min
{
1, λ√
φ(c(j))
}
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and λ is chosen such that the budget constraint
is satisfied with equality
n∑
j=1
A(c(j))ψ(c(j)) = B
where ψ and φ are the non-regularized and regularized virtual cost function when the underlying
cost distribution is the uniform distribution over C. The value of λ can be computed using binary
search.
Proof. For simplicity, we write Ak = A(c(k)) and A
∗
k = A
∗(c(k)). Notice that the objective function
is an increasing function of zj for all j and thus the maximum is obtained when zj = 1 for all
j. Then the objective function of our minimization problem becomes
∑n
j=1
1
Aj
. In the region
Aj > 0 for all j, the objective function is convex. Therefore the KKT conditions are necessary and
sufficient for optimality of the primal and dual variables (see Boyd and Vandenberghe [2004]). The
Lagrangian function of the optimization problem is
L(A, ξ, pi, η0, η1) =
n∑
j=1
1
Aj
+ ξ
 n∑
j=1
Ajψ(c(j))−B

+
n−1∑
j=1
pij(Aj+1 −Aj)
+
n∑
j=1
η0jAj +
n∑
j=1
η1j (Aj − 1).
We prove that the optimal primal variables are A∗(c) = min
{
1, λ√
φ(c)
}
, where λ is chosen such
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that the budget constraint is satisfied with equality, and the optimal dual variables are
ξ =
1
λ2
,
pij = pij−1 + ξ
(
ψ(c(j))− φ(c(j))
)
, (Here we assume pi0 = 0.)
η0j = 0 for all j,
η1j =
{
1− ξ · φ(c(j)), if ξ · φ(c(j)) < 1,
0, otherwise.
Primal feasibility: We first prove the primal feasibility.
1. By the definition of A∗, the budget constraint is satisfied with equality.
2. By (1) in Lemma C.1, φ(c) is a non-decreasing function of c. Then A∗(c) = min
{
1, λ√
φ(c)
}
is a non-increasing function.
3. It is easy to verify that 0 ≤ A∗(c) ≤ 1.
Dual feasibility: By (3) in Lemma C.1, it is easy to verify that all of the dual variables greater
or equal to 0.
Stationarity: The partial derivative of L(A, ξ, pi, η0, η1) with respect to each Aj is
∂L(A, ξ, η0, η1)
∂Aj
=− 1
A2j
+ ξ · ψ(c(j)) + pij−1 − pij + η0j + η1j
=−max{1, ξ · φ(c(j))}+ ξ · ψ(c(j)) + pij−1 − pij + η1j
=− ξ · φ(c(j)) + ξ · ψ(c(j)) + pij−1 − pij .
By the definition of pij, we have the above quantity equal to 0.
Complementary slackness:
1. The budget constraint in the primal is satisfied with equality.
2. For all A∗j 6= A∗j+1, we must have φ(c(j)) 6= φ(c(j+1)). Then by (3) in Lemma C.1, pij = 0.
Thus pij(A
∗
j+1 −A∗j ) = 0 for all j.
3. We have η0j = 0 for all j and η
1
j = 0 for all A
∗
j =
1√
ξ·φ(c(j))
< 1.
As we have proved, the optimal allocation rule is monotone non-increasing. Since the sum∑n
j=1A
∗
jψ(c(j)) is an increasing function of λ, we can perform binary search to find the right value
of λ such that the sum equals the budget. Moreover, we can reduce the search space to |C| by
searching the critical point c∗ ∈ C that has λ√
φ(c)
≥ 1 for c ≤ c∗ and λ√
φ(c)
≤ 1 for c ≥ c∗.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.1.
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C.2 Optimal Mechanism for Adjacent Cost Sets
In this section, we show that the optimal solution A will not change a lot if we slightly modify the
optimization problem (8), more specifically, if the set of costs contains one more element.
We first show that if the set of costs contains one more element, the regularized virtual costs
function φ(c) of the uniform distribution over this set will change no more than a factor of 2, which
is mainly because the virtual costs ψ(ci) = i · ci − (i− 1)ci−1 change at most by a factor of 2.
Lemma C.2. Let T1 and T2 be two costs sets that only differ in one element ck. More specifically,
suppose T2 = {c1, . . . , cm} with c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cm and T1 = {c1, . . . , ck−1, ck+1, . . . , cm}. Let φ1(c) be
the regularized virtual cost function (Definition 3.3) of the discrete uniform distribution over T1
and let φ2(c) be the regularized virtual cost function of the discrete uniform distribution over T2.
Then it holds that for all i 6= k,
1
2
· φ1(ci) ≤ φ2(ci) ≤ 2 · φ1(ci).
Proof. According to Definition 3.1, the (non-regularized) virtual costs are
ψ1(c1) = c1, . . . , ψ1(ck−1) = (k − 1)ck−1 − (k − 2)ck−2,
ψ1(ck+1) = k · ck+1 − (k − 1)ck−1,
ψ1(ck+2) = (k + 1)ck+2 − k · ck+1, . . . , ψ1(C) = i · C − (i− 1)ci
and
ψ2(c1) = c1, . . . , ψ2(ck−1) = (k − 1)ck−1 − (k − 2)ck−2,
ψ2(ck) = k · ck − (k − 1)ck−1, ψ2(ck+1) = (k + 1) · ck+1 − k · ck,
ψ2(ck+2) = (k + 2)ck+2 − (k + 1) · ck+1, . . . , ψ2(C) = (i+ 1) · C − i · ci
(i) For i, j < k, Avg1(i, j) = Avg2(i, j).
(ii) For Avg2(i, j) that has i < k and j = k, we have
Avg1(i, k − 1)−Avg2(i, k) =(k − 1) · ck−1 − (i− 1)ci−1
k − i −
k · ck − (i− 1)ci−1
k − i+ 1
=
(i− 1)(ck − ci−1)
(k − i)(k − i+ 1)
=
(i− 1)(ck − ci−1)
k − i+ 1 ·
1
k − i
∈ [0, Avg2(i, k)]
Thus 12 ·Avg1(i, k − 1) ≤ Avg2(i, k) ≤ Avg1(i, k − 1).
(iii) For i < k and j ≥ k+1, we have Avg1(i, j) = (j−1)cj−(i−1)ci−1j−i and Avg2(i, j) =
j·cj−(i−1)ci−1
j−i+1 .
Then
Avg1(i, j)−Avg2(i, j) = (i− 1)(cj − ci−1)
(j − i)(j − i+ 1) ≤
(i− 1)(cj − ci−1)
j − i ·
1
j − i+ 1 ∈
[
0, Avg1(i, j) · 1
2
]
.
Thus 12Avg1(i, j) ≤ Avg2(i, j) ≤ Avg1(i, j).
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(iv) For i, j ≥ k + 2, we have Avg1(i, j) = (j−1)cj−(i−2)ci−1j−i+1 and Avg2(i, j) =
j·cj−(i−1)ci−1
j−i+1 . Then
Avg2(i, j) −Avg1(i, j) = cj − ci−1
j − i+ 1 ≤
cj
j − i+ 1 ≤
(j − 1)cj − (i− 2)ci−1
j − i+ 1 ∈ [0, Avg1(i, j)] .
Thus Avg1(i, j) ≤ Avg2(i, j) ≤ 2 · Avg1(i, j).
According to the above four properties of the Avg function and the definition of ψ′(ci), we have
1
2
· ψ′1(ci) ≤ ψ′2(ci) ≤ 2ψ′1(ci), for i < k and i ≥ k + 2. (9)
To compare ψ′1(ci) and ψ
′
2(ci) for the case i = k + 1, we prove the follows
• max{ψ′2(ck), ψ′2(ck+1)} ≥ 12ψ′1(ck+1) : Observe that
ψ2(ck) + ψ2(ck+1) = (k + 1)ck+1 − (k − 1)ck−1 ≥ k · ck+1 − (k − 1)ck−1 = ψ1(ck+1).
Therefore Avg2(k, k + 1) ≥ 12Avg1(k + 1, k + 1) and at least one of the ψ2(ck) and ψ2(ck+1)
must be no less than ψ1(ck+1)/2. If ψ2(ck) ≥ ψ1(ck+1)/2, then
Avg2(k, k) ≥ 1
2
Avg1(k + 1, k + 1)
Avg2(k, k + 1) ≥ 1
2
Avg1(k + 1, k + 1)
In addition, by (iv) we have Avg2(k + 2, j) ≥ Avg1(k + 2, j) for all j ≥ k + 2, so
Avg2(k, j) ≥ 1
2
Avg1(k + 1, j)
for all j ≥ k + 2. Then
ψ′2(ck) = min
j≥k
Avg2(k, j) ≥ 1
2
min
j≥k+1
Avg1(k + 1, j) =
1
2
ψ′1(ck+1).
Similarly for the other case ψ2(ck+1) ≥ ψ1(ck+1)/2 we can get ψ′2(ck+1) ≥ 12ψ′1(ck+1).
• max{ψ′2(ck), ψ′2(ck+1)} ≤ 2ψ′1(ck+1) : Observe that
ψ2(ck) + ψ2(ck+1) =(k + 1) · ck+1 − (k − 1)ck−1
=ck+1 + (k · ck+1 − (k − 1)ck−1)
≤2(k · ck+1 − (k − 1)ck−1)
=2ψ1(ck+1).
Thus both ψ2(ck) and ψ2(ck+1) is no greater than 2ψ1(ck+1). Furthermore by (iv), Avg2(k+
2, j) ≤ 2Avg1(k + 2, j) for all j ≥ k + 2, it holds that
Avg2(k, j) ≤ 2Avg1(k + 1, j), Avg2(k + 1, j) ≤ 2Avg1(k + 1, j)
for all j ≥ k + 1. Thus
ψ′2(ck) = min
j≥k
Avg2(k, j) ≤ min
j≥k+1
2Avg1(k + 1, j) = 2ψ
′
1(ck+1)
ψ′2(ck+1) = min
j≥k+1
Avg2(k + 1, j) ≤ min
j≥k+1
2Avg1(k + 1, j) = 2ψ
′
1(ck+1)
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Combining the above two inequalities with (9),
φ2(ci) = max
j≤i
ψ′2(cj) ≤ 2 ·max
j≤i
ψ′1(cj) = 2φ1(ci), for all i 6= k
φ1(ci) = max
j≤i
ψ′1(cj) ≤ 2 ·max
j≤i
ψ′2(cj) = 2φ2(ci), for all i 6= k
which completes the first part of the proof.
Based on the above analysis, we further prove the follows.
Lemma C.3. Let T1 and T2 be two costs sets that have T2 = {c1, . . . , cm} with c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cm and
T1 = {c1, . . . , ck−1, ck+1, . . . , cm}. Let φ1(c) be the regularized virtual cost function (Definition 3.3)
of the discrete uniform distribution over T1 and let φ2(c) be the regularized virtual cost function of
the discrete uniform distribution over T2. Then it holds that for all number K ≥ 0,∑
c∈T1
min
{
φ1(c),K
√
φ1(c)
}
≤
∑
c∈T2
min
{
2φ2(c),K
√
2φ2(c)
}
∑
c∈T2
min
{
φ2(c),K
√
φ2(c)
}
≤
∑
c∈T1
min
{
2φ1(c), 2K
√
φ1(c)
}
.
Proof. By Lemma C.2, for i 6= k, φ1(ci) ≤ 2φ2(ci). Thus the first inequality holds as follows,∑
c∈T1
min
{
φ1(c),K
√
φ1(c)
}
≤
∑
c∈T2
min
{
2φ2(c),K
√
2φ2(c)
}
.
By Lemma C.2, for i 6= k, φ2(ci) ≤ 2φ1(ci). In addition, we have
ψ2(ck) + ψ2(ck+1) =(k + 1)ck+1 − (k − 1)ck−1
=ck+1 + k · ck+1 − (k − 1)ck−1
≤2(k · ck+1 − (k − 1)ck−1)
=2ψ1(ck+1).
By our definition of regularized virtual cost function, it always holds that∑
c∈T2
min
{
φ2(c),K
√
φ2(c)
}
≤
∑
c∈T1
min
{
2φ1(c), 2K
√
φ1(c)
}
.
The following lemma will be used in our proof of the main theorem.
Lemma C.4. Let T1 and T2 be two costs sets that have T2 = {c1, . . . , ck, . . . , cm} with c1 ≤ · · · ≤
cm and T1 = {c1, . . . , ck−1, ck+1, . . . , cm}. Let B be an arbitrary non-negative number. We use
MOPT (T,B) to represent the optimal unbiased estimator mechanism defined in (??), when the cost
set is T and the budget is B. Then define
• (A1, P1) = MOPT (T1, B/2), i.e., (A1, P1) is the optimal mechanism when the cost set is T1
and the budget is B/2.
• (A2, P2) =MOPT (T2, B), i.e., (A2, P2) is the optimal mechanism when the cost set is T2 and
the budget is B.
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• (A3, P3) = MOPT (T2, B/4), i.e., (A3, P3) is the optimal mechanism when the cost set is T2
and the budget is B/4.
Then we have
A1(ci) ≤ A2(ci) for all i ≥ k + 1, A1(ck+1)P1(ck+1) ≤ A2(ck+1)P2(ck+1),
A1(ci) ≥ A3(ci) for all i ≥ k + 1, A1(ck+1)P1(ck+1) ≥ A3(ck+1)P3(ck+1).
Proof. Let φ1(c) be the regularized virtual cost function (Definition 3.3) of the discrete uniform
distribution over T1 and let φ2(c) be the regularized virtual cost function of the discrete uniform
distribution over T2. Then according to Lemma 3.1,
Ai(c) = min
{
1,
λi√
φi(c)
}
and the value of λ1, λ2 and λ3 should satisfy∑
c∈T1
min
{
φ1(c), λ1
√
φ1(c)
}
= B/2,
∑
c∈T2
min
{
φ2(c), λ2
√
φ2(c)
}
= B,
∑
c∈T2
min
{
φ2(c), λ3
√
φ2(c)
}
= B/4,
We first compare A1 and A3. By the first inequality of Lemma C.3,∑
c∈T1
min
{
φ1(c),
√
2 · λ3
√
φ1(c)
}
≤
∑
c∈T2
min
{
2φ2(c),
√
2 · λ3
√
2φ2(c)
}
≤ 2 · B/4 = B/2.
Because the value of λ1 is optimal when the cost set is T1 and the budget is B/2, it should satisfy
that λ1 ≥
√
2 · λ3. And since φ1(ci) ≤ 2φ2(ci) for all i ≥ k + 1 according to Lemma C.2, we get
A3(ci) = min
{
1,
λ3√
φ2(ci)
}
≤ min
{
1,
λ1/
√
2√
φ1(ci)/2
}
= A1(ci)
for all i ≥ k + 1. Similarly we have
A1(ci) = min
{
1,
λ1√
φ1(ci)
}
≤ min
{
1,
λ2/
√
2√
φ2(ci)/2
}
= A2(ci)
for all i ≥ k + 1.
The expected payment of the two allocation rules can be compared according to the definition
in Lemma 3.2,
A1(ck+1)P1(ck+1) =A1(ck+1)ck+1 +
∫ C
ck+1
A1(v) dv
≤A2(ck+1)ck+1 +
∫ C
ck+1
A2(v) dv = A2(ck+1)P2(ck+1).
Here we use integrals to equivalently represent the payment rule as in Lemma B.1.
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C.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1
We prove that when we use the following allocation rule
Ai =argmin
A
max
z∈[0,1]i
i∑
k=1
z2k
A(c(k))
(10)
s.t.
i∑
k=1
A(c(k))ψ
i(c(k)) ≤
B
4
√
n/i
A(c(k)) ≥ A(c(k+1)),∀k
0 ≤ A(c(k)) ≤ 1, ∀k
at round i and output Horvitz-Thompson Estimator S = 1n
∑n
i=1 yi =
1
n
∑n
i=1
x̂i
Ai(ci)
at last, the
mechanism (1) is truthful and individually rational; (2) the expected total spending is no more
than B; (3) for any cost distribution {c1, . . . , cn}, the worst-case variance of the final estimator S
is no more than roughly 16 times the benchmark defined in Definition 5.1. The worst case variance
of the benchmark equals
Var∗(A∗) =
1
(n+ 1)2
min
A
max
z∈[0,1]n
n+1∑
i=1
z2i
A(ci)
−
n+1∑
i=1
z2i (11)
s.t.
n+1∑
i=1
A(ci)ψ(ci) ≤ B
A(ci) ≥ A(ci+1), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1, ∀c
where we let cn+1 = C for notation simplicity.
To prove budget feasibility and the performance of the mechanism, we construct an intermediate
mechanism (A′, P ′) at each step i. This intermediate mechanism (A′, P ′) is basically the same as
(Ai, P i), but is “one-step-ahead”. Loosely speaking, (A′, P ′) is the optimal mechanism when the
same amount of budget is assigned at round i, but knows an additional piece of information, the
value of ci, beforehand. We compare (A
′, P ′) with (Ai, P i) based on the results in Section C.2.
Notations: Before the proof, we define some notations. Let c(1) ≤ · · · ≤ c(n) be the ordered
costs from smallest to largest. We use E[X|{c1, . . . , ck}] to represent the conditional expectation
of random variable X conditioning on the event that the set of the first k data holders’ costs is
{c1, . . . , ck}. We use E[X|c1, . . . , ck] to represent the conditional expectation of random variable X
given that the sequence of the first k data holders’ costs is c1, . . . , ck, i.e., the first data holder has
cost c1, the second has c2 and so on so forth. Notations are the same for the conditional variance
Var(X|{c1, . . . , ck}) and Var(X|c1, . . . , ck). Unless otherwise stated, the randomness is taken over
the random arriving order and the internal randomness of the mechanism.
C.3.1 Truthfulness and Individual Rationality
It is easy to see that the extended allocation rule and payment rule of a truthful mechanism is
still truthful. The payment rule also guarantees individual rationality as P i(c) is always greater or
equal to c by definition.
33
C.3.2 Expected Budget Feasibility
Suppose the costs of the population is {c1, . . . , cn}. The total expected spending of the mechanism
is
∑n
i=1 E[A
i(ci) ·P i(ci)]. Consider a fixed round i. Let Si be the set of first i− 1 agents’ costs and
define Ti = Si∪{C}. Similarly let Si+1 be the set of first i agents’ costs and define Ti+1 = Si+1∪{C}.
Then conditioning on the event that the set of first i− 1 costs is Si, the allocation rule Ai can be
uniquely decided, which is the solution of
Ai = min
A
∑
c∈Ti
1
A(c)
s.t.
∑
c∈Ti
A(c)ψi(c) ≤ B
4
√
n/i
A is monotone non-increasing
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1, ∀c ∈ Ti
Notice that ci /∈ Ti, so A(ci) is not a decision variable of the mathematical program defined above.
The value of A(ci) is decided by Definition 3.2. Let c(1), . . . , c(i) be the first i costs in non-decreasing
order and let c(i+1) = C. Suppose ci is the k-th smallest cost, i.e., ci = c(k). Then according to
Definition 3.2,
Ai(ci) = A
i(c(k)) = A
i(c(k+1))
where c(k+1) belongs to Ti. Now consider the following allocation rule A
′
A′ = min
A
∑
c∈Ti+1
1
A(c)
s.t.
∑
c∈Ti+1
A(c)ψi+1(c) ≤ B
2
√
n/i
A is monotone non-increasing
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1, ∀c ∈ Ti+1
Since Ti, Ti+1 only differ by one element ci, and A
′ uses twice the budget of Ai, according to
Lemma C.4,
Ai(ci)P
i(ci) =A
i(c(k+1))P
i(c(k+1)) ≤ A′(c(k+1))P ′(c(k+1)).
Now assume the set of the first i costs is Si+1. When the data holders come in random order, ci
is a random element chosen from Si+1. Therefore ci’s rank k should be uniformly distributed over
{1, . . . , i}, and thus
E[Ai(ci) · P i(ci)|Si+1] ≤E[A′(c(k+1))P ′(c(k+1))|Si+1]
=
1
i
·
i∑
j=1
A′(c(j+1))P ′(c(j+1))
≤ 1
2
√
n · i ·B.
Therefore the total spending of the mechanism is bounded as
n∑
i=1
E[Ai(ci) · P i(ci)] ≤
n∑
i=1
B
2
√
n · i ≤ B,
since
∑n
i=1
1√
i
≤ 2√n.
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C.3.3 Competitive Analysis
We first show that the variance of the final estimator S = 1n
∑n
i=1 yi can be upper bounded by the
sum of the variances “occur at each round”.
Lemma C.5. For a population with costs {c1, . . . , cn} and any cost-data distribution D that is
consistent with the costs, the variance of the output estimator of Mechanism 1 can be upper bounded
as
Var(S) ≤ 1
n2
n∑
i=1
E
[
y2i
]
,
where yi =
x̂i
Ai(ci)
is the re-weighted data.
Proof. According to the law of total variance,
Var(S) = E [Var(S|c1, . . . , cn)] + Var (E[S|c1, . . . , cn]) ,
Since the estimator is always unbiased, conditional mean E[S|c1, . . . , cn] always equals to the mean
of n data points
∑n
i=1 zi/n for any order c1, . . . , cn. Because the variance of a constant is zero, the
second term Var (E[S|c1, . . . , cn]) equals 0. Therefore
Var(S) = E [Var(S|c1, . . . , cn)] .
Notice that conditioning on the cost sequence c1, . . . , cn, the allocation rules used at each round
A1, . . . , An will be fixed. Thus y1, . . . , yn become independent. So we have
E [Var(S|c1, . . . , cn)] = E
[
1
n2
·Var
(
n∑
i=1
yi
∣∣∣ c1, . . . , cn
)]
=
1
n2
· E
n∑
i=1
Var
(
yi
∣∣∣ c1, . . . , cn)
≤ 1
n2
· E
n∑
i=1
E
[
y2i | c1, . . . , cn
]
=
1
n2
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ]
Let yi =
x̂i
Ai(ci)
be the re-weighted observed data at round i. The following lemma compares the
expectation E[y2i ] with the worst-case variance of A
∗.
Lemma C.6. For any distribution D that is consistent with the cost distribution {c1, . . . , cn}, when
the data holders come in random order, Mechanism 1 has
E[y2i ] ≤
8 · √n√
i
·
(
nVar∗(A∗) + 1 +
1
i
· 1
A∗(C)
)
.
Proof. We fix a time step i. Let Si be the set of first i− 1 agents’ costs and define Ti = Si ∪ {C}.
And similarly let Si+1 be the set of first i agents’ costs and define Ti+1 = Si+1 ∪ {C}. We first
consider a fixed Si+1 and compare E[y
2
i |Si+1] with Var∗(A∗), where the randomness of E[y2i |Si+1]
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is taken over the random arriving order and the internal randomness of the mechanism. We will
define an intermediate allocation rule A′ and compare it with both Ai and A∗.
Conditioning on the event that the set of first i − 1 costs is Si, the allocation rule Ai can be
uniquely decided, which is the solution of
Ai = min
A
∑
c∈Ti
1
A(c)
s.t.
∑
c∈Ti
A(c)ψi(c) ≤ B
4
√
n/i
A is monotone non-increasing
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1, ∀c ∈ Ti
Notice that agent i’s cost ci /∈ Ti, so A(ci) is not a decision variable of the mathematical program
defined above. The value of A(ci) is decided by Definition 3.2. Let c(1), . . . , c(i) be the first i costs
in non-decreasing order and let c(i+1) = C. Suppose ci is the k-th smallest cost, i.e., ci = c(k). Then
Ai(ci) = A
i(c(k)) = A
i(c(k+1))
where c(k+1) belongs to Ti. Now consider the following allocation rule A
′
A′ = min
A
∑
c∈Ti+1
1
A(c)
s.t.
∑
c∈Ti+1
A(c)ψi+1(c) ≤ B
8
√
n/i
A is monotone non-increasing
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1, ∀c ∈ Ti+1
Comparing A′ with A∗: We first compare A′ with A∗ by proving that A
∗
8
√
n/i
is a feasible solution
of the mathematical program that defines A′. Let ψ(c) be the virtual cost function when the
underlying cost distribution is the uniform distribution over T = {c1, . . . , cn, C}. Then according
to definition, the benchmark A∗ satisfies the constraint
∑
c∈T A
∗(c)ψ(c) ≤ B. Combine this with
Lemma B.2, ∑
c∈Ti+1
A∗
8
√
n/i
· ψi+1(c) ≤
∑
c∈T
A∗
8
√
n/i
· ψ(c) ≤ B
8
√
n/i
.
Therefore A
∗
8
√
n/i
is a feasible solution of the mathematical program that defines A′. Then since A′
is the optimal solution, we have
∑
c∈Ti+1
1
A′(c)
≤
∑
c∈Ti+1
8
√
n/i
A∗(c)
. (12)
Comparing A′ with Ai: Now we compare Ai(ci) = Ai(c(k+1)) with A′(c(k+1)). Since Ti and Ti+1
only differs in one element ci = c(k) and A
′ uses half of the budget of Ai, according to Lemma C.4,
Ai(c(k+1)) ≥ A′(c(k+1)). (13)
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for any set of costs Si+1 of first i agents.
Conditioning on the event that the set of the first i costs is Si+1, when the data holders come
in random order, ci is a random element chosen from Si+1 = {c(1), . . . , c(i)}. Therefore ci’s rank k
should be uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , i}. Together with (13), we have
E[y2i |Si+1] ≤ E
[
1
Ai(c(k+1))
∣∣∣Si+1] ≤ E [ 1
A′(c(k+1))
∣∣∣Si+1] = 1
i
i∑
k=1
1
A′(c(k+1))
.
Then by equation (12),
E[y2i |Si+1] ≤
1
i
i∑
k=1
1
A′(c(k+1))
≤ 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
1
A′(c)
≤ 8 ·
√
n/i
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
1
A∗(c)
.
Now we are ready to compute E[y2i ] by averaging E[y
2
i |Si+1] over random subset Si+1 (when the
agents come in random order, Si+1 is a random subset of {c1, . . . , cn} with length i).
E[y2i ] =ESi+1E[y
2
i |Si+1]
≤8 ·
√
n/i
i
· ESi+1
 ∑
c∈Ti+1
1
A∗(c)

=
8 ·
√
n/i
i
· ESi+1
 ∑
c∈Si+1
1
A∗(c)
+
1
A∗(C)

=8 ·
√
n/i
(
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
1
A∗(ci)
+
1
i
· 1
A∗(C)
)
≤8 ·
√
n/i
(
(n+ 1)2
n
· Var∗(A∗) + 1 + 1
i
· 1
A∗(C)
)
.
Combining the two lemmas, for any joint distribution of cost and data, the variance of the
output estimator of our mechanism satisfies
Var(S) ≤ 1
n2
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ]
≤ 1
n2
n∑
i=1
8 · √n√
i
(
(n+ 1)2
n
·Var∗(A∗) + 1 + 1
i
· 1
A∗(C)
)
=
8
√
n
n2
(
(n+ 1)2
n
· Var∗(A∗) + 1
)
·
n∑
i=1
1√
i
+
8 · √n
n2
· 1
A∗(C)
·
∑ 1
i
√
i
≤16 ·
(
(n+ 1)2
n2
Var∗(A∗) +
1
n
+
√
n
n2
· 1
A∗(C)
)
since
∑n
i=1
1√
i
≤ 2√n and ∑ni=1 1√i·i ≤ 2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
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D Proofs for Optimal Confidence Interval
We then give the proofs for the optimal online confidence interval estimator. In Section D.1,
we give the characterization of the optimal solution (A∗, U∗, P ∗) and show how to compute it.
In Section D.3, we prove some lemmas that will be used to compare our mechanism with the
benchmark in Section D.4.
D.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We prove that the optimal solution of
A∗, U∗ =argmin
A,U
β2 · 1
n
n∑
j=1
1− Uj
A(c(j))
+
 1
n
n∑
j=1
Uj
2 (14)
s.t.
n∑
j=1
(1− Uj) ·A(c(j))ψ(c(j)) ≤ B
(1− Uj) · A(c(j)) is monotone non-increasing in j
0 ≤ A(c(j)) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Uj ≤ 1, ∀j
is as follows
U∗j =

0, if φ(c(j)) < H
p ∈ (0, 1], if φ(c(j)) = H
1, if φ(c(j)) > H
A∗(c(j)) = min
1, λ√φ(c(j))

λ is chosen such that
∑n
j=1(1 − Uj) · A(c(j))ψ(c(j)) = B and the optimal value of λ and H can be
found using binary search.
The following lemma proves that the optimal solution should have U∗ as described above for
some H, and A∗ should be non-increasing.
Lemma D.1. Let U∗ and A∗ be the optimal solution of (14), then U∗j should be non-decreasing
in j and A∗(c(j)) should be non-increasing in j. In addition, if A∗(c(j)) 6= A∗(c(j+1)), then at least
one of U∗j and U
∗
j+1 should be equal to 0 or 1.
Proof. We first prove the monotonicity of U∗ and A∗. Let U ′ and A′ be a feasible solution. Suppose
U ′ decreases at some position j, i.e., U ′j > U
′
j+1. We prove that that U
′ cannot be optimal
because it is not the optimal solution of the following optimization problem (for simplicity we write
Aj = A(c(j))).
min
Aj ,Aj+1,Uj,Uj+1
(1− Uj)
Aj
+
(1− Uj+1)
Aj+1
(15)
s.t. (1− Uj)Aj = (1− U ′j)A′(c(j))
(1− Uj+1)Aj+1 = (1− U ′j+1)A′(c(j+1))
(1− Uj) + (1− Uj+1) = (1− U ′j) + (1− U ′j+1)
0 ≤ Uj , Uj+1, Aj , Aj+1 ≤ 1.
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It is easy to see that a feasible solution of the above problem is also a feasible solution of (14). And
a strictly better solution than A′, U ′ in the above problem will give a strictly better solution of (14).
If we write the right-hand constant of the three equalities as D1,D2,D3 and let Oj = 1− Uj, then
the objective function can be represented as a single variable function of Oj ,
(1− Uj)
Aj
+
(1− Uj+1)
Aj+1
=
O2j
D1
+
(D3 −Oj)2
D2
.
Its derivative with respect to Oj equals
2Oj
D1
− 2(D3−Oj)D2 . The value of this derivative at point
Oj = 1− U ′j is
2
(
(1− U ′j)
(1− U ′j)A′(c(j))
− (1− U
′
j+1)
(1− U ′j+1)A′(c(j+1))
)
.
SinceA′, U ′ is a feasible solution, it should satisfy the constraint (1−U ′j)A′(c(j)) ≥ (1−U ′j+1)A′(c(j+1)).
Therefore if we have 1 ≥ U ′j > U ′j+1 ≥ 0, this derivative will be negative, which means that the ob-
jective value can be decreased by slightly decrease U ′j (it will still be feasible because U
′
j > U
′
j+1 ≥ 0).
Therefore the optimal U∗ must be monotone non-decreasing. The monotonicity of A∗ can be proved
by the same arguments, that is, to assume that A′j < A
′
j+1 for some j and show that it cannot be
the optimal solution of the above optimization problem.
The same approach can be used to prove that the second part. Let U ′ and A′ be an optimal
solution with A′(c(j)) 6= A′(c(j+1)) and U ′j, U ′j+1 ∈ (0, 1) for some j. We again consider the
optimization (15). Again the value of the derivative at point Oj = 1− U ′j is
2
(
1
A′(c(j))
− 1
A′(c(j+1))
)
.
Since an optimal allocation rule must be non-increasing, the value of this derivative is negative. By
the same argument in the first part, U ′ cannot be optimal, which is contradictory.
Therefore the optimal U∗j ∈ (0, 1) only for j’s that have the same A∗(c(j)). Based on this, we
further prove the following lemma.
Lemma D.2. Let l be the smallest number that has U∗l ∈ (0, 1) and let r be the largest number
that has U∗r ∈ (0, 1). Then φ(c(l)) = φ(c(r)).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary, φ(c(l)) < φ(c(r)). We construct another feasible solution that is
strictly better than A∗, U∗. Define Il = {k : φ(c(k)) = φ(c(l))} and Ir = {k : φ(c(k)) = φ(c(r))}.
Il, Ir should both contain consecutive numbers. Let Rl be the right end point of Il and let Lr
be the left end point of Ir. First by definition of regularized virtual costs, φ(c(r)) = φ(c(Lr)) =
mink:k≥Lr Avg(Lr, k), where Avg is the average function of ψ. Then
Avg(Lr, r) ≥ min
k:k≥Lr
Avg(Lr, k) = φ(c(r)).
Meanwhile according to Claim C.2 in the proof of Lemma C.1, we should have
Avg(l, Rl) ≤ Avg(Il) = φ(c(l)) < φ(c(r)).
In addition, if Rl + 1 ≤ Lr − 1, then φ(c(j)) < φ(c(r)) for all j ∈ [Rl + 1, Lr − 1], which means
Avg(Rl + 1, Lr − 1) < φ(c(r)). Therefore we should have
Avg(l, Lr − 1) < φ(c(r)) ≤ Avg(Lr, r). (16)
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Therefore we can construct a better solution by uniformly decreasing U∗l , . . . , U
∗
Lr−1 and uniformly
increasing U∗Lr , . . . , U
∗
r by a small amount, so that the total increase is equal to the total decrease.
The value of the objective function β2 · 1n
∑n
k=1
1−U∗
k
A∗(c(k))
+
(
1
n
∑n
k=1 U
∗
k
)2
remains the same, because
(1)
∑n
k=1 U
∗
k does not change and (2) the value of A
∗(c(k)) is the same for all k ∈ [l, r] according
to Lemma D.1. But the total expected spending
∑n
k=1(1 − U∗k ) · A∗(c(k))ψ(c(k)) strictly decreases
due to (16), which means that the objective value can be strictly improved.
So the lemma shows that U∗j ∈ (0, 1) only for j’s that have the same φ(c(j)). We then prove
the other direction: for j’s that have the same φ(c(j)), there exists an optimal solution that has the
same U∗j for these j’s.
Lemma D.3. There exists an optimal solution (U∗, A∗) such that for all (j, k) that has φ(c(j)) =
φ(c(k)), U
∗
j = U
∗
k and A
∗(c(j)) = A∗(c(k)).
Proof. Define PH to be the set of j’s that have φ(c(j)) = H. Then the elements in PH must be
consecutive. Suppose PH = {l, . . . , r}.
Let U∗, A∗ be an optimal solution. We show that the following solution U ′, A′ is also feasible
and has objective value no larger than that of U∗, A∗:
U ′j =
1
r − l + 1
r∑
k=l
U∗k , for all j ∈ PH
A′(c(j)) =
∑r
k=l(1− U∗k )A∗(c(k))∑r
k=l 1− U∗k
, for all j ∈ PH .
We first prove that U ′, A′ is feasible. The monotonicity constraint and the range constraint are
trivially satisfied. For the budget constraint on
∑n
j=1(1−Uj) ·A(c(j))ψ(c(j)), first observe that the
sum
∑r
k=l(1− U ′k)A′(c(k)) remains the same as
∑r
k=l(1− U∗k )A∗(c(k)),
r∑
k=l
(1− U ′k)A′(c(k)) =
(
r∑
k=l
1− U ′k
)
A′(c(l))
=
(
r∑
k=l
1− U∗k
)∑r
k=l(1− U∗k )A∗(c(k))∑r
k=l 1− U∗k
=
r∑
k=l
(1− U∗k )A∗(c(k)).
By definition of regularized virtual costs, Avg(l, r) = φ(c(l)) = mink:k≥lAvg(l, k), where Avg is the
average function of ψ. Thus
Avg(l, r) ≤ Avg(l, k) for all k ∈ [l, r].
And since (1 − U∗(c))A∗(c) must be non-increasing, by shifting (1 − U∗(c))A∗(c) to be constant
within PH , the total expected spending must only decrease,
r∑
k=l
(1− U ′k) ·A′(c(k))ψ(c(k)) ≤
r∑
k=l
(1− U∗j ) ·A∗(c(k))ψ(c(k)).
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Then we prove the optimality of U ′, A′. Because
∑r
k=l U
′
k =
∑r
k=l U
∗
k , the second term of the
objective function remains the same. For the first term, since f(x) = 1x is a convex function when
x > 0, by Jensen’s inequality,
r∑
k=l
1− U ′k
A′(c(k))
=
(
r∑
k=l
1− U ′k
)
1
A′(c(l))
=
(
r∑
k=l
1− U∗k
)
1∑r
k=l
1−U∗
k∑r
k=l 1−U∗k
A∗(c(k))
≤
(
r∑
k=l
1− U∗k
)
r∑
k=l
1− U∗k∑r
k=l 1− U∗k
1
A∗(c(k))
=
r∑
k=l
(1− U∗k )
1
A∗(c(k))
.
Therefore U ′, A′ is no worse than U∗, A∗, and is thus optimal.
Combining the above three lemmas, there exists an optimal U∗ as defined in the theorem. Next,
we characterize the optimal A∗.
Lemma D.4. If we fixed an optimal solution of U : U∗1 , . . . , U
∗
j , which should have U
∗
j = U
∗
k if
φ(c(j)) = φ(c(k)) according to Lemma D.3, then the optimal solution of A should be equal to
A∗(c(j)) = min
1, λ√φ(c(j))
 ,
where λ is chosen such that the budget constraint is satisfied with equality
n∑
j=1
(1− U∗j ) ·A∗(c(j))ψ(c(j)) = B.
Proof. When U is fixed as U∗1 , . . . , U
∗
j , then the optimal A
∗ should be the solution of
A∗ =argmin
A
n∑
j=1
(1− U∗j )
A(c(j))
s.t.
n∑
j=1
(1− U∗j ) ·A(c(j))ψ(c(j)) ≤ B
(1− U∗j )A(c(j)) is monotone non-increasing in j
0 ≤ A(c(j)) ≤ 1, ∀j
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The Lagrangian function is (for simplicity we write Aj = A(c(j)))
L(A, ξ, pi, η0, η1) =
n∑
j=1
1− U∗j
Aj
+ ξ
 n∑
j=1
(1− U∗j )Ajψ(c(j))−B

+
n∑
j=1
pij
(
(1− U∗j+1)Aj+1 − (1− U∗j )Aj
)
+
n∑
j=1
η0jAj +
n∑
j=1
η1j (Aj − 1).
We prove that the optimal primal variables are
A∗j = min
1, λ√φ(c(j))
 ,
where λ is chosen such that the budget constraint is satisfied with equality
∑n
j=1(1−U∗j )·A∗jψ(c(j)) =
B, and the optimal dual variables are
ξ =
1
λ2
,
pij = pij−1 + ξ
(
ψ(c(j))− φ(c(j))
)
, (Here we assume pi0 = 0.)
η0j = 0 for all j,
η1j =
{
(1− U∗j )
(
1− ξ · φ(c(j))
)
, if ξ · φ(c(j)) < 1,
0, otherwise.
Primal feasibility: We first prove the primal feasibility.
1. By our definition of A∗, the budget constraint should be satisfied with equality.
2. By (1) in Lemma C.1, φ(c) is a non-decreasing function of c. Then A∗(c) = min
{
1, λ√
φ(c)
}
is
a non-increasing function. And since U∗j is non-decreasing in j, (1−U∗j )A∗j is non-increasing
in j.
3. It is easy to verify that 0 ≤ A∗(c) ≤ 1.
Dual feasibility: By (3) in Lemma C.1, it is easy to verify that all of the dual variables greater
or equal to 0.
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Stationarity: The partial derivative of L(A, ξ, pi, η0, η1) with respect to each Aj is
∂L(A, ξ, η0, η1)
∂Aj
=− 1− Uj
A2j
+ ξ · (1− Uj)ψ(c(j)) + (1− Uj)pij−1 − (1− Uj)pij + η0j + η1j
=− (1− Uj)max
{
1, ξ · φ(c(j))
}
+ ξ · (1− Uj) · ψ(c(j)) + (1− Uj)pij−1 − (1− Uj)pij + η1j
= ξ(1− Uj) · (ψ(c(j))− φ(c(j))) + (1− Uj)pij−1 − (1− Uj)pij
= 0
By the definition of pij, we have the above quantity equal to 0.
Complementary slackness:
1. The budget constraint in the primal is satisfied with equality.
2. For all A∗j 6= A∗j+1, we must have φ(c(j)) 6= φ(c(j+1)). Then by (3) in Lemma C.1, pij = 0. Since
U∗j = U
∗
j+1 if φ(c(j)) = φ(c(j+1)) (which meansA
∗
j = A
∗
j+1), pij
(
(1− U∗j+1)A∗j+1 − (1− U∗j )A∗j
)
=
0 for all j.
3. We have η0j = 0 for all j and η
1
j = 0 for all A
∗
j =
1√
ξ·φ(c(j))
< 1.
Therefore there must exists an optimal solution U∗, A∗ as stated in the theorem.
D.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3
By Lemma 3.1, the optimal value of λ can be found using binary search after U∗ is decided.
Define M =
∑i
k=1 U
∗
k . Then when M is decided, we can immediately find a rule U
∗ that has the
characterization in the theorem, and the optimal A∗ can be computed as well. We now show how
to find optimal M that minimizes
β2 · 1
n
n∑
j=1
1− Uj
A(c(j))
+
(
M
n
)2
using binary search within time O(log |C|).
Let g(M) be the the optimal value of the first term β2 · 1n
∑n
j=1
1−Uj
A(c(j))
whenM is decided. Then
the objective function is just g(M) +
(
M
n
)2
. The second term
(
M
n
)2
is a convex function of M . We
prove that g(M) is also a convex function of M . Before the main proof, we first prove the following
claim.
Claim D.1. Let U∗, A∗ be an optimal solution as stated in the theorem. Then
n∑
j=1
(1− U∗j ) · A∗(c(j))φ(c(j)) =
n∑
j=1
(1− U∗j ) ·A∗(c(j))ψ(c(j)) = B.
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Proof. For each j, let Ij be the set of all the k that has φ(c(k)) = φ(c(j)). And let I be the set of
all different Ij , then according to (2) in Lemma C.1 and the definition of A
∗,
n∑
j=1
(1− U∗j )A∗jφ(c(j)) =
∑
I∈I
∑
j∈I
(1− U∗j )A∗jφ(c(j))
=
∑
I∈I
(1− U∗I )A∗I
∑
j∈I
φ(c(j))
=
∑
I∈I
(1− U∗I )A∗I
∑
j∈I
ψ(c(j))
=
n∑
j=1
(1− U∗j )A∗jψ(c(j)) = B,
where A∗I is the the same A
∗
j for all j ∈ I, U∗I is the same U∗j for all j ∈ I.
Lemma D.5. The function g(M) is a convex function of M . Furthermore, let AM be an optimal
allocation rule when
∑n
j=1 Uj =M and let c(r) be the largest cost that is not ignored with probability
1. Then for non-integer M that has AM (c(r)) < 1,
∂g(M)
∂M
= −β2 · 2
n
· 1
AM (c(r))
.
which is an non-decreasing function of M .
Proof. To simplify the notation, in the proof of this lemma, we use c1, . . . , cn instead of c(1), . . . , c(n)
to represent the costs in C ordered from smallest to largest. To better illustrate how our objective
value changes as M increases, we consider an equivalent optimization problem that is defined as
follows:
A∗,M∗ = argmin
A,M
β2 · 1
n
∫ n−M
0
1
A(x)
dx+
(
M
n
)2
(17)
s.t.
∫ n−M
0
A(x) · φ(cx) dx ≤ B
A is monotone non-increasing
0 ≤ A(x) ≤ 1, ∀ 0 ≤ x ≤ n
where
cx = c⌈x⌉, ∀ 0 ≤ x ≤ n,
and thus φ(cx) = φ(c⌈x⌉). This optimization problem is equivalent to (14) because
1. For any feasible solution (A(x),M) of the above optimization problem, we can find a feasible
solution of (14) (A(cj), Uj) with better objective value by setting A(cj) equal to the mean of
A(x) for x ∈ {y : y ≤ n −M and φ(cy) = φ(cj)}, and setting Uj to be the mean of indicator
function 1(x ≥ n − M) for x ∈ {y : φ(cy) = φ(cj)}. It can be verified that the budget
constraint of (14) is still satisfied according to (2) in Lemma C.1. And the objective function
only gets smaller because the mean of the reciprocals is no smaller than the reciprocal of the
mean, as the reciprocal function is convex.
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2. For any optimal solution A(cj), Uj of (14) that has the characterization as stated in the
theorem, we can find a feasible solution A(x),M of the above optimization problem with the
same objective value by setting M =
∑
j Uj , A(x) = A(c⌈x⌉).
Therefore by the characterization in Lemma D.4, if we fix a threshold M , there exists an optimal
allocation rule, denoted by A∗M (x), which is equal to
A∗M (x) = min
{
1,
λM√
φ(cx)
}
for 0 ≤ x ≤ n−M , and λM is chosen such that the budget constraint is satisfied with equality. By
Claim D.1, the value of λM satisfies
n∑
j=1
(1− U∗j ) · A∗(c(j))φ(c(j)) =
n∑
j=1
(1− U∗j ) ·A∗(c(j))ψ(c(j)) = B,
or equivalently using A∗M (x) and M ,∫ n−M
0
A∗M (x)φ(cx) dx =
∫ n−M
0
min
{
φ(cx), λM
√
φ(cx)
}
dx = B.
Recall that
g(M) = β2 · 1
n
∫ n−M
0
1
A∗M (x)
dx.
Take derivative of the above function3, by the Leibniz’s rule for differentiation under the integral,
∂g(M)
∂M
=
∂
∂M
(
β2 · 1
n
∫ n−M
0
1
A∗M (x)
dx
)
(18)
=β2 · 1
n
(
− 1
A∗M (n−M)
−
∫ n−M
0
1
A∗M (x)2
· ∂A
∗
M (x)
∂M
dx
)
.
We denote the quantity inside the brackets by Q, then the derivative equals β2 · 1n ·Q. Let t be the
maximum of x that has A∗M (x) = 1. Then for all x ∈ [0, t], we should have ∂A
∗
M (x)
∂M = 0, because λM
can only increase as M increase, which means A∗M (x) can only increase for x ∈ [0, t], but they have
already reached the upper bound 1, which means that A∗M (x) will stay the same as M increase
for all x ∈ [0, t]. Then we can remove the part 0 ≤ x < t of ∫ n−M0 − 1A∗M (x)2 · ∂A∗M (x)∂M dx because it
integrates to zero. So the term inside the brackets is equal to
Q =− 1
A∗M (n−M)
−
∫ n−M
t
1
A∗M (x)2
· ∂A
∗
M (x)
∂M
dx
=
∂
∂M
(∫ n−M
t
1
A∗M (x)
dx
)
=
∂
∂M
(∫ n−M
t
√
φ(cx)
λM
dx
)
. (19)
3The function g(M) may not be differentiable at integer points, but is semi-differentiable, WLOG we use right
derivatives at those points.
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To further simplify the derivative, we represent λM as a function of φ(cx). Since λM is chosen such
that the budget constraint is satisfied with equality, i.e.,∫ n−M
0
A∗M (x)φ(cx) dx = B.
And since t is defined such that for x ∈ [0, t], A∗M (x) = 1; for x ∈ (t, i−M ], A∗M (x) = λM√φ(cx) , the
above equality is equivalent to∫ t
0
φ(cx) +
∫ n−M
t
λM
√
φ(cx) dx = B.
Therefore the value of λM should satisfy
λM =
B − ∫ t0 φ(cx) dx∫ n−M
t
√
φ(cx) dx
.
Plug the above expression of λM into (19), we get
Q =
∂
∂M

(∫ n−M
t
√
φ(cx) dx
)2
B − ∫ t0 φ(cx) dx

=
1
B − ∫ t0 φ(cx) dx
(
2 ·
∫ n−M
t
√
φ(cx) dx
)(
−
√
φ(cn−M )
)
=
2
λM
(
−
√
φ(cn−M )
)
by definition of λM . Plug it into (18),
∂g(M)
∂M
= β2 · 1
n
· 2
λM
(
−
√
φ(cn−M )
)
.
Recall that M represents the amount of data that is ignored. When M increases, λM will increase,
and
√
φ(cn−M ) will decrease as the regularized virtual cost function is an increasing function.
Therefore this partial derivative
β2 · 1
n
· 2
λM
(
−
√
φ(cn−M )
)
= −β2 · 2
n
· 1
A∗M (n−M)
is an increasing function of M .
Then the optimal threshold
M∗ = argmin
M
g(M) +
(
M
n
)2
.
should have the derivative greater than zero on its right, i.e., for M > M∗,
2M
n2
> β2 · 2
n
· 1
A∗M (n−M)
.
and smaller than zero on the left, i.e., for M < M i,
2M
n2
< β2 · 2
n
· 1
A∗M (n−M)
.
Thus the optimal M∗ can be found by binary search.
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D.3 Optimal Mechanism for Adjacent Cost Sets
The following lemmas will be used in the proof of the main theorem.
Lemma D.6. Let T1 and T2 be two adjacent costs sets that have T2 = {c1, . . . , ck, . . . , ci+1} with
c1 ≤ · · · ≤ ci+1 and T1 = {c1, . . . , ck−1, ck+1, . . . , ci+1}. Let B be an arbitrary non-negative number.
We use OPT (T,B) to represent the optimal confidence interval mechanism (at round i) defined
in (??) when the cost set is T and the budget is B. Then define
• (A,U, P ) = OPT (T1, B/2), i.e., (A,U, P ) is the optimal mechanism when the cost set is T1
and the budget is B/2.
• (A′, U ′, P ′) = OPT (T2, B), i.e., (A′, U ′, P ′) is the optimal mechanism when the cost set is T2
and the budget is B.
Then we have
(1− Uk+1)A(ck+1)P (ck+1) ≤ 2 · (1− U ′k+1)A′(ck+1)P ′(ck+1).
Proof. The proof of this lemma is based on the proof of Lemma 4.3.
We use cr ∈ T1 to represent the largest cost that has Ur < 1, and use cr′ ∈ T2 to represent
the largest cost that has U ′r′ < 1. And define M =
∑
c∈T1 Uc and M
′ =
∑
c∈T2 U
′
c. To better
illustrate the idea of our proof, we assume that the minimum point of our objective function is
always achieved when its derivative with respect to M is equal to 0, which means that
a · 1
A(cr)
=M
a · 1
A′(cr′)
=M ′
where a = 4α2γ · i/n is a constant (see the proof of Lemma 4.3 for more details). The following
analysis can be extended to the case when the derivative does not exists at the optimal point, but
is greater than zero on the right and smaller than zero on the left.
First of all if k > r′, which means mechanism (A′, U ′, P ′) never purchase ck, as well as ck+1.
Then we can remove ck from T2 to get a new optimal mechanism OPT (T1, B). Then the new r
′
should only move to the left,4 which means we still have k > r′ and the new mechanism never
purchase ck. Because the budget of (A,U, P ) = OPT (T1, B/2) is even smaller, it will not purchase
ck or ck+1 either. Therefore the inequality holds with both sides equal to zero.
Now suppose k ≤ r′. To compare the two mechanisms, we define (A′′, U ′′, P ′′) to be the
optimal mechanism when (1) the cost set is T1 and the budget is B/2 (which is the same as
those of (A,U, P )) and (2) the total probability of ignoring the data points equals that of U ′, i.e.,∑
c∈T1 U
′′
c =
∑
c∈T2 U
′
c. Then we can apply Lemma C.4 to compare the non-zero parts of the two
mechanisms. By the first line of the results in Lemma C.4,
A′′(cr′) ≤ A′(cr′),
and thus
a · 1
A′′(cr′)
≥ a · 1
A′(cr′)
=M ′,
According to the proof of Lemma 4.3, the optimal mechanism (A,U, P ) must have r ≤ r′ and
M ≥M ′. Then
A(cr) = a/M ≤ a/M ′ = A′(cr′) ≤ A′(cr).
4This is because (1) M ′ decreases and (2) Avg(r′ + 1, j) will only increase for all j ≥ r′ + 1.
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According to Lemma C.2, φ2(cr) ≥ 12φ1(cr), together with the characterization of the optimal
allocation rule in Theorem 4.1, (for the mechanism to be non-trivial, we assume A(cr) < 1)
λ = A(cr)
√
φ1(cr) ≤ A′(cr)
√
2φ2(cr) ≤
√
2λ′.
Again by Lemma C.2, φ2(cj) ≤ 2φ1(cj) for all j ≥ k + 1. Thus for all j ≥ k + 1,
A(cj) = min
{
1,
λ√
φ1(cj)
}
≤ min
{
1,
√
2λ′√
φ2(cj)/2
}
≤ 2min
{
1,
λ′√
φ2(cj)
}
= 2A′(cj).
In addition, it should hold that U j ≥ U ′j for all j ≥ k+1.5 According to the definition in Lemma 3.2
(see (1−U(c))A(c) as an allocation rule here), the expected payment can be equivalently represented
as an integral as in Lemma B.1,
(1− Uk+1)A(ck+1)P (ck+1) =(1− Uk+1)A(ck+1)ck+1 +
∫ C
ck+1
(1− Uv)A(v) dv
≤2(1− U ′k+1)A′(ck+1)ck+1 + 2
∫ C
ck+1
(1− U ′v)A′(v) dv
=2(1− U ′k+1)A′(ck+1)P ′(ck+1),
which completes our proof.
Lemma D.7. Let T1 and T2 be two adjacent costs sets that have T2 = {c1, . . . , ck, . . . , ci+1} with
c1 ≤ · · · ≤ ci+1 and T1 = {c1, . . . , ck−1, ck+1, . . . , ci+1}. Let B be an arbitrary non-negative number.
We use OPT (T,B) to represent the optimal confidence interval mechanism (at round i) defined
in (??) when the cost set is T and the budget is B. Then define
• (A,U, P ) = OPT (T1, B), i.e., (A,U, P ) is the optimal mechanism when the cost set is T1 and
the budget is B.
• (A′, U ′, P ′) = OPT (T2, B/2), i.e., (A′, U ′, P ′) is the optimal mechanism when the cost set is
T2 and the budget is B/2.
Define M =
∑
c∈T1 Uc and M
′ =
∑
c∈T2 U
′
c and Wk+1 = 1
(
Uk+1 ≥ 12
)
. Then we have
• M ≤M ′.
• 4 · α
2
γ
n ·
1−Wk+1
A(ck+1)
≤ 8 · α
2
γ
n ·
1−U ′k+1
A′(ck+1)
+ U ′k+1 · M
′
i .
Proof. The proof of this lemma is based on the proof of Lemma 4.3.
Again we use cr ∈ T1 to represent the largest cost that has Ur < 1, and use cr′ ∈ T2 to represent
the largest cost that has U ′r′ < 1. To better illustrate the idea of our proof, we assume that the
minimum point of our objective function is achieved when its derivative with respect to M is equal
to 0, which means that
a · 1
A(cr)
=M (20)
a · 1
A′(cr′)
=M ′ (21)
5This is because (1) M ≥ M ′ and (2) Avg(l, r) will only increase for all l ≤ k+1, r ≥ k+1 and Avg(l, r) will only
decrease for all l, r > k + 1, so Ik+1 will only extend to the right.
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where a = 4α2γ · i/n is a constant (see the proof of Lemma 4.3 for more details). The following
analysis can be extended to the case when the derivative does not exists at the optimal point, but
is greater than zero on the right and smaller than zero on the left.
First consider the case k + 1 > r′, which means U ′k+1 = 1 and mechanism (A
′, U ′, P ′) never
purchase ck+1. If k + 1 is also greater than r, which means that Wk+1 = 1 and (A,U, P ) never
purchases ck+1, then the inequality trivially holds with both sides equal to zero. If k+1 ≤ r, then
since U ′k+1 = 1,
a
i
· 1−Wk+1
A(ck+1)
≤a
i
· 1
A(cr)
=
M
i
=
a
i
· 1− U
′
k+1
A′(ck+1)
+ U ′k+1 ·
M
i
≤a
i
· 1− U
′
k+1
A′(ck+1)
+ U ′k+1 ·
M ′
i
.
Now suppose k + 1 ≤ r′. To compare the two mechanisms, we define (A′′, U ′′, P ′′) to be
the optimal mechanism when (1) the cost set is T1 and the budget is B (which is the same as
those of (A,U, P )) and (2) the total probability of ignoring the data points equals that of U ′, i.e.,∑
c∈T1 U
′′
c =
∑
c∈T2 U
′
c. Then we can apply Lemma C.4 to compare the non-zero parts of the two
mechanisms. By the second line of the results in Lemma C.4,
A′′(cr′) ≥ A′(cr′),
and thus
a · 1
A′′(cr′)
≤ a · 1
A′(cr′)
=M ′.
According to the proof of Lemma 4.3, the optimal mechanism (A,U, P ) must have M ≤ M ′ and
r ≥ r′. Then by (20) and (21),
A(cr′) ≥ A(cr) = a/M ≥ a/M ′ = A′(cr′).
According to Lemma C.2, φ2(cr′) ≤ 2φ1(cr′), together with the characterization of the optimal
allocation rule in Theorem 4.1, (for the mechanism to be non-trivial, we assume A′(cr′) < 1)
λ ≥ A(cr′)
√
φ1(cr′) ≥ A′(cr′)
√
φ2(cr′)/2 =
√
1/2λ′.
Again by Lemma C.2, φ2(cj) ≥ 12φ1(cj) for all j ≥ k + 1. Thus for all j ≥ k + 1,
A(cj) = min
{
1,
λ√
φ1(cj)
}
≥ min
{
1,
√
1/2λ′√
2 · φ2(cj)
}
≥ 1
2
min
{
1,
λ′√
φ2(cj)
}
=
1
2
A′(cj).
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In addition, 1A(ck+1) ≤
1
A(cr)
= Ma due to the monotonicity constraint. Therefore
a
i
· 1−Wk+1
A(ck+1)
=
a
i
· 1− U
′
k+1 + U
′
k+1
A(ck+1)
≤a
i
· 1− U
′
k+1
A(ck+1)
+ U ′k+1 ·
M
i
≤2a
i
· 1− U
′
k+1
A′(ck+1)
+ U ′k+1 ·
M
i
≤2a
i
· 1− U
′
k+1
A′(ck+1)
+ U ′k+1 ·
M ′
i
.
which completes our proof.
D.4 Proof of Theorem 5.2
We now prove the main theorem for the online confidence interval mechanism. Define set Ti =
{c1, . . . , ci−1, C}. We use c(1), . . . , c(i) to denote the elements in Ti ordered from smallest to largest.
Let
Ai, U i =argmin
A,U
4 · α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
i∑
j=1
(1− Uj)
A(c(j))
+
1
i
i∑
j=1
Uj
2
s.t.
i∑
j=1
(1− Uj) ·A(c(j))ψi(c(j)) ≤
B
16
√
n/i
(1− Uj) · A(c(j)) is monotone non-increasing in j
0 ≤ A(c(j)) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Uj ≤ 1, ∀j
We prove that when we use the extended allocation rule of
(
Ai(c),1
(
U i(c) ≥ 12
))
at round i,
and output confidence interval
[∑n
i=1 yi/n− αγ√n · σ̂,
∑n
i=1 yi/n +
Û
n +
αγ√
n
· σ̂
]
at the end, where
Û =
∑n
i=1 Ûi, our mechanism (1) is truthful in expectation and individually rational (2) satisfies
the budget constraint B in expectation; (3) and the for any cost distribution {c1, . . . , cn}, the
worst-case expected length of the output confidence interval is no more than
L ≤ 8
√
10 · L∗ + 2
√
10√
n
+ o(1/
√
n),
where L∗ is the approximate worst-case expected length of the benchmark A∗, U∗ defined in
Lemma 4.1,
L∗ = min
A
max
z∈[0,1]n
2 · αγ√
n+ 1
·
√√√√ 1
n+ 1
·
n+1∑
i=1
(1− Ui)z2i
A(c(i))
+
∑n+1
i=1 zi · Ui
n+ 1
(22)
s.t.
n+1∑
i=1
(1− Ui) ·A(c(i))ψ(c(i)) ≤ B
(1− Uc)A(c) is monotone non-increasing in c
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Uc ≤ 1, ∀c
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For convenience we define
V ∗ = 4 · α
2
γ
n
· 1
n
n∑
i=1
1− U∗(ci)
A∗(ci)
so that L∗ ≥ nn+1
√
V ∗ +
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n , where
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i is the expected total number of data ignored by
A∗.
The basic idea of the proof is the same as the unbiased case. We will again use an intermediate
mechanism (A′, U ′, P ′) to compare (Ai, U i, P i) with the benchmark at each round i. The difference
of (A′, U ′, P ′) and (Ai, U i, P i) is bounded using the results in the preceding section.
We use the same notations as in the proofs of the unbiased case C.3. The proofs of (1) in C.3
can be directly applied here, so we only prove (2) and (3).
D.4.1 Expected budget feasibility
The proof of budget feasibility is similar to the unbiased case. To bound
∑n
i=1 E[(1−Ûi)Ai(ci)P i(ci)],
we again define A′ conditioning on a fixed Ti+1 = Si+1 ∪ {C}.
A′, U ′ =argmin
A,U
4 · α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
(1− Uc)
A(c)
+
1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
Uc
2
s.t.
∑
c∈Ti+1
(1− Uc) ·A(c)ψi(c) ≤ B
8
√
n/i
(1− Uc) ·A(c) is monotone non-increasing in c
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Uc ≤ 1, ∀c
Since Ti, Ti+1 only differ by one element ci, and A
′ uses twice the budget of Ai, according to
Lemma D.6,
(1− U i(ci))Ai(ci)P i(ci) =(1− U i(c(k+1)))Ai(c(k+1))P i(c(k+1))
≤2(1− U ′(c(k+1)))A′(c(k+1))P ′(c(k+1)).
And thus(
1− 1 (U i(c(k+1)) ≥ 1/2))Ai(c(k+1))P i(c(k+1) ≤2(1− U i(c(k+1)))Ai(c(k+1))P i(c(k+1))
≤4(1− U ′(c(k+1)))A′(c(k+1))P ′(c(k+1)).
Now assume the set of the first i costs is Si+1. When the data holders come in random order, ci
is a random element chosen from Si+1. Therefore ci’s rank k should be uniformly distributed over
{1, . . . , i}, and thus
E[(1− Ûi)Ai(ci) · P i(ci)|Si+1] =1
i
i∑
j=1
(
1− 1 (U i(c(j+1)) ≥ 1/2))Ai(c(j+1))P i(c(j+1))
≤1
i
i∑
j=1
4(1 − U ′(c(j+1)))A′(c(j+1))P ′(c(j+1))
≤4
i
·
∑
c∈Ti+1
(1− U ′(c))A′(c)P ′(c)
≤ 1
2
√
n · i ·B
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for all Si+1. Therefore the total spending of the mechanism is bounded as
n∑
i=1
E[(1− Ûi)Ai(ci) · P i(ci)] ≤
n∑
i=1
B
2
√
n · i ≤ B,
since
∑n
i=1
1√
i
≤ 2√n.
D.4.2 Competitive analysis
The expected length of the output confidence interval is equal to
L = 2 · αγ√
n
· E[σ̂] + E[Û ]/n.
To compare it with L∗, we first upper bound the expectation of the sample variance E[σ̂2] with
E[y2i ].
Lemma D.8. For any underlying distribution D, our mechanism has
E[σ̂2] ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ],
where σ̂2 is the sample variance of the re-weighted data y1 =
x̂1
A1(c1)
, . . . , yn =
x̂n
An(cn)
.
Proof. Because yi’s are independent conditioned on c1, . . . , cn,
E[σ̂2|c1, . . . , cn] =E
 n∑
i=1
(
yi −
n∑
i=1
yi/n
)2
/(n − 1)
∣∣∣c1, . . . , cn

=
1
n− 1 · E
 n∑
i=1
y2i −
2
n
n∑
i=1
yi
n∑
i=1
yi + n ·
(
n∑
i=1
yi/n
)2 ∣∣∣c1, . . . , cn

=
1
n− 1 · E
 n∑
i=1
y2i −
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
yi
)2 ∣∣∣c1, . . . , cn

=
1
n− 1 · E
 n∑
i=1
y2i −
1
n
n∑
i=1
y2i −
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
yiyj
∣∣∣c1, . . . , cn

=
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ]−
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
E[yi|c1, . . . , cn]E[yj |c1, . . . , cn]
≤ 1
n
·
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ]
We then prove that the sum of the squares of the two terms in L can be bounded using V ∗ and
(U∗/n)2. We first prove the following lemma:
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Lemma D.9. Let Si+1 be the set of first i agents’ costs. When the agents come in random order,
Si+1 is a random subset of {c1, . . . , cn} with length i. Then it satisfies that
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[σ̂]2 +
(
E[Û ]/n
)2
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
ESi+1
[
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[y2i |Si+1] + E[Ûi|Si+1]2
]
.
Proof. First by Jensen’s inequality,
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[σ̂]2 + (E[Û ]/n)2 ≤4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[σ̂2] +
(
n∑
i=1
E[Ûi]/n
)2
≤ 4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[σ̂2] + 1
n
n∑
i=1
E[Ûi]
2.
As we prove in Lemma D.8, E[σ̂2] ≤ 1n
∑n
i=1 E[y
2
i ], so we further have
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[σ̂]2 +
(
E[Û ]/n
)2
≤4 · α
2
γ
n
· 1
n
n∑
i=1
E[y2i ] +
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[Ûi]
2
≤4 · α
2
γ
n
· 1
n
n∑
i=1
ESi+1E[y
2
i |Si+1] +
1
n
n∑
i=1
ESi+1E[Ûi|Si+1]2
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
ESi+1
[
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[y2i |Si+1] + E[Ûi|Si+1]2
]
.
Then the sum of the squares of the two terms in L can be bounded as follows:
Lemma D.10. For any underlying distribution D, our mechanism has
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[σ̂]2 +
(
E[Û ]/n
)2
≤320 · V ∗ + 20
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+ 10
(
1 + lnn
n
)2
+
2
n
(
640 · α
2
γ√
n
· 1− U
∗
C
A∗(C)
+ 10
(
U∗
C
)2)
.
where σ̂2 is the sample variance of the re-weighted data y1 =
x̂1
A1(c1)
, . . . , yn =
x̂n
An(cn)
, and Û is the
number of data points ignored by the mechanism, i.e., Û =
∑n
i=1 Ûi.
Proof. Let Si+1 be the set of first i agents’ costs. When the agents come in random order, Si+1
is a random subset of {c1, . . . , cn} with length i. We first consider a fixed Si+1 and bound 4 · α
2
γ
n ·
E[y2i |Si+1] + E[Ûi|Si+1]2. Let Si ⊆ Si+1 be the set of first i− 1 costs is Si, the allocation rule Ai is
uniquely decided as in (14) where Ti = Si∪{C}. Again if ci = c(k), we will have Ai(ci) = Ai(c(k+1)).
Let Ti+1 = Si+1 ∪ {C}. We define the following intermediate allocation rule A′, U ′
A′, U ′ =argmin
A,U
4 · α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
(1− Uc)
A(c)
+
1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
Uc
2 (23)
s.t.
∑
c∈Ti+1
(1− Uc) ·A(c)ψi(c) ≤ B
32
√
n/i
(1− Uc) ·A(c) is monotone non-increasing in c
0 ≤ A(c) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Uc ≤ 1, ∀c
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Claim D.2 (Compare
(
Ai,1
(
U i ≥ 12
))
with (A′, U ′)). Define M ′ =
∑
c∈Ti+1 U
′
c, then
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[y2i |Si+1] + E[Ûi|Si+1]2 ≤ 5
4 · α2γ
n
· 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
1− U ′c
A′(c)
+
(
M ′
i
)2 .
Proof. When the data holders come in random order, the set of first i − 1 costs Si is a random
subset of Si+1. Therefore ci’s rank k is uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , i}. Let Ai,k, U i,k be the
optimal solution in round i when the i-th cost ci has rank k, i.e., ci = c(k). Then
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[y2i |Si+1] + E[Ûi|Si+1]2
=4 · α
2
γ
n
1
i
i∑
k=1
1− 1
(
U i,kk+1 ≥ 12
)
Ai,k(c(k+1))
+(1
i
i∑
k=1
1
(
U i,kk+1 ≥
1
2
))2
.
Denote 1
(
U i,kk+1 ≥ 12
)
by W i,kk+1, the above equality becomes
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[y2i |Si+1] + E[Ûi|Si+1]2 = 4 ·
α2γ
n
(
1
i
i∑
k=1
1−W i,kk+1
Ai,k(c(k+1))
)
+
(
1
i
i∑
k=1
W i,kk+1
)2
. (24)
To compare it with (A′, U ′), we first claim the follows
Claim D.3. Let M ′ =
∑
c∈Ti+1 U
′
c, then
1
i
i∑
k=1
W i,kk+1 =
1
i
i∑
k=1
1
(
U i,kk+1 ≥
1
2
)
≤ 2M ′/i.
Proof. Define
M i,k = U i,k1 + · · ·+ U i,kk−1 + U i,kk+1 + · · ·+ U i,ki .
By Lemma D.7, M i,k ≤M ′ for every k ∈ [i], which means
U i,k1 + · · · + U i,kk−1 + U i,kk+1 + · · ·+ U i,ki ≤M ′,
so each U i,k has at most 2M ′ entries that are no less than 12 . And since U
i,k is monotone non-
decreasing, i.e., U i,k1 ≤ · · · ≤ U i,kk−1 ≤ U i,kk+1 ≤ · · · ≤ U i,ki , only the last 2M ′ entries can be no less
than 12 . Therefore there are at most 2M
′ non-zero 1
(
U i,kk+1 ≥ 12
)
, thus
1
i
i∑
k=1
1
(
U i,kk+1 ≥
1
2
)
≤ 2M ′/i.
Meanwhile, according to Lemma D.7,
4 · α
2
γ
n
· 1−W
i,k
k+1
Ai,k(c(k+1))
≤ 8 · α
2
γ
n
· 1− U
′
k+1
A′(c(k+1))
+ U ′k+1 ·
M ′
i
(25)
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for all k. Then (24) can be bounded as
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[y2i |Si+1] + E[Ûi|Si+1]2
=4 · α
2
γ
n
(
1
i
i∑
k=1
1−W i,kk+1
Ai,k(c(k+1))
)
+
(
1
i
i∑
k=1
W i,kk+1
)2
≤8 · α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
1− U ′c
A′(c)
+
1
i
i∑
k=1
U ′k+1 ·
M ′
i
+ (2M ′/i)2
≤8 · α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
1− U ′c
A′(c)
+
M ′
i
· M
′
i
+ (2M ′/i)2
=8 · α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
1− U ′c
A′(c)
+ 5
(
M ′
i
)2
.
which completes the proof of Claim D.2.
Claim D.4 (Compare A∗ with A′).
4 · α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
(1− U ′c)
A′(c)
+
1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
U ′c
2 ≤ 128√n
i
· α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
(1− U∗c )
A∗(c)
+
1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
U∗c
2 .
Proof. By the same reasoning as the proof of unbiased case (see Section C.3.3), it can be proved
that A
∗
32
√
n/i
, U∗ is a feasible solution of (23).
Combine Claim D.2 and Claim D.4,
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[y2i |Si+1] + E[Ûi|Si+1]2
≤5
4 · α2γ
n
· 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
1− U ′c
A′(c)
+ (M ′)2

≤5
128√n
i
· α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
(1− U∗c )
A∗(c)
+
1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
U∗c
2 .
Now we compute ESi+1
[
4 · α
2
γ
n · E[y2i |Si+1] + E[Ûi|Si+1]2
]
by averaging over Si+1 Since Si+1 is
a random subset, the first term of the right-hand side is just
128
√
n
i
· α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
 ∑
c∈Si+1
1− U∗c
A∗(c)
+
1− U∗
C
A∗(C)
 =128√n
i
· α
2
γ
n
 1
n
n∑
j=1
1− U∗j
A∗(cj)
+
1
i
· 1− U
∗
C
A∗(C)

=32
√
n
i
· V ∗ + 128
√
n
i
· α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
·
1− U∗
C
A∗(C)
.
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Next, we upper bound the second term ESi+1
[(
1
i
∑
c∈Si+1 U
∗
c
)2]
. Since Si+1 = {c1, . . . , ci} is a
random subset,
ESi+1
1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
U∗c
2
=ESi+1
1
i
∑
c∈Si+1
U∗c +
1
i
· U∗
C
2
≤ESi+1
2
1
i
∑
c∈Si+1
U∗c
2 + 2(1
i
· U∗
C
)2
=
2
i2
· ESi+1
 ∑
c∈Si+1
(U∗c )
2 +
∑
c,c′∈Si+1:c 6=c′
U∗c · U∗c′
+ 2
i2
(
U∗
C
)2
=
2
i2
· ESi+1
∑
c
1(c ∈ Si+1)(U∗c )2 +
∑
c,c′:c 6=c′
1(c, c′ ∈ Si+1)U∗c · U∗c′
+ 2
i2
(
U∗
C
)2
=
2
i2
· i
n
n∑
i=1
(U∗i )
2 +
2
i2
· i(i− 1)
n(n− 1)
n∑
j=1
∑
k∈[n],k 6=j
U∗j · U∗k +
2
i2
(
U∗
C
)2
≤2
i
· 1
n
n∑
i=1
U∗i + 2 ·
(i− 1)n
i(n − 1) ·
1
n2
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
U∗j · U∗k +
2
i2
(
U∗
C
)2
≤2
i
·
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
+ 2
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+
2
i2
(
U∗
C
)2
.
Therefore
ESi+1
[
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[y2i |Si+1] + E[Ûi|Si+1]2
]
≤5 · ESi+1
128√n
i
· α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
(1− U∗c )
A∗(c)
+
1
i
∑
c∈Ti+1
U∗c
2
≤5
(
32
√
n
i
· V ∗ + 128
√
n
i
· α
2
γ
n
· 1
i
·
1− U∗
C
A∗(C)
+
2
i
·
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
+ 2
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+
2
i2
(
U∗
C
)2)
=10
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+ 160
√
n
i
· V ∗ + 10
i
·
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
+
640
i
√
i
· α
2
γ√
n
· 1− U
∗
C
A∗(C)
+
10
i2
(
U∗
C
)2
.
Define D1 = 10
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
, D2 = 160 ·V ∗, D3 = 10
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n , D4 = 640 ·
α2γ√
n
· 1−U
∗
C
A∗(C)
, D5 = 10
(
U∗
C
)2
,
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then the above expectation becomes D1 +
√
n·D2√
i
+ D3i +
D4
i
√
i
+ D5i2 . Finally, by Lemma D.9, we get
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[σ̂]2 +
(
E[Û ]/n
)2
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
ESi+1
[
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[y2i |Si+1] + E[Ûi|Si+1]2
]
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(
D1 +
√
n ·D2√
i
+
D3
i
+
D4
i
√
i
+
D5
i2
)
≤D1 + 2D2 + 1 + lnn
n
·D3 + 2
n
(D4 +D5)
since
∑n
i=1
1√
i
≤ 2√n and∑ni=1 1i ≤ 1+ln n and∑ni=1 1√i·i ≤ 2. We can further replace D1+ 1+lnnn ·
D3 with a sum-of-square term 20
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+ 10
(
1+lnn
n
)2
, which will make it easier to compare
the quantity with the benchmark (details in the last paragraph of the proof).
Claim D.5.
D1 +
1 + lnn
n
·D3 ≤ 20
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+ 10
(
1 + lnn
n
)2
.
Proof. By defintioin,
D1 +
1 + lnn
n
·D3 = 10
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+
1 + lnn
n
· 10
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
We prove the inequality by cases. First, if
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i ≤ 1+lnn then the second term on the right-hand
side 1+lnnn ·
10
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n ≤ 10 (1+lnn)
2
n2 . If
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i ≥ 1 + lnn then 1+lnnn ·
10
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n ≤ 10
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
.
In any cases, we get
D1 +
1 + lnn
n
·D3 ≤ 20
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+ 10
(
1 + lnn
n
)2
.
Finally by plugging in all the numbers,
4 · α
2
γ
n
· E[σ̂]2 +
(
E[Û ]/n
)2
≤20
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+ 10
(
1 + lnn
n
)2
+ 2D2 +
2
n
(D4 +D5)
≤20
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+ 10
(
1 + lnn
n
)2
+ 320 · V ∗ + 2
n
(
640 · α
2
γ√
n
· 1− U
∗
C
A∗(C)
+ 10
(
U∗
C
)2)
=320 · V ∗ + 20
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+ 10
(
1 + lnn
n
)2
+
2
n
(
640 · α
2
γ√
n
· 1− U
∗
C
A∗(C)
+ 10
(
U∗
C
)2)
.
This completes the proof of the Lemma D.10.
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Finally we compare the worst-case expected length of our confidence interval with the bench-
mark L∗. Our output confidence interval
[∑n
i=1 yi/n− αγ√n · σ̂,
∑n
i=1 yi/n+
Û
n +
αγ√
n
· σ̂
]
has ex-
pected length L = E[2 · αγ√
n
· σ̂ + Ûn ]. Then for any underlying cost-data distribution D, L2 can be
bounded as follows using Lemma D.10 and the inequalities (a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2+ b2), a2+ b2 ≤ (a+ b)2
for all a, b ≥ 0.
L2 =
(
2 · αγ√
n
· E[σ̂] + E[Û ]
n
)2
≤ 2
4 · α2γ
n
· E[σ̂]2 +
(
E[Û ]
n
)2
≤ 2
(
320 · V ∗ + 20
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+ 10
(
1 + lnn
n
)2
+
2
n
(
640 · α
2
γ√
n
· 1− U
∗
C
A∗(C)
+ 10
(
U∗
C
)2))
= 640 · V ∗ + 40
(∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+ 20
(
1 + lnn
n
)2
+
2560
n
· α
2
γ√
n
· 1− U
∗
C
A∗(C)
+
40
n
(
U∗
C
)2
≤ 640
(√
V ∗ +
∑n
i=1 U
∗
i
n
)2
+ 20
(
1 + lnn
n
)2
+
2560
n
· α
2
γ√
n
· 1− U
∗
C
A∗(C)
+
40
n
(
U∗
C
)2
= 640 ·
(
n+ 1
n
· L∗
)2
+ 20
(
1 + lnn
n
)2
+
2560
n
· α
2
γ√
n
·
1− U∗
C
A∗(C)
+
40
n
(
U∗
C
)2
.
Since
√∑
j aj ≤
∑
j
√
aj ,
L ≤ 8
√
10 · n+ 1
n
· L∗ + 2
√
5 · (1 + lnn)
n
+
16
√
10√
n
· αγ
n1/4
·
√
1− U∗
C
A∗(C)
+
2
√
10√
n
.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2.
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